Freedom House Security T urkey’s policy approach to transnational repression lacks consistency. Although it has demonstrated competence in addressing threats posed by some malign states, it has also facilitated or ignored extraterritorial violence used or attempted by other states. Turkey prevents, punishes, or allows transnational repression within its borders based on foreign policy considerations and prevailing winds in its relationships with other states. Prevent, punish, or facilitate When it comes to certain groups of dissidents, Turkey’s government has demonstrated that it can use traditional counterintelligence operations, criminal laws, and police powers to counter transnational repression. For example, in 2019 Turkey arrested and charged two men for spying on behalf of the United Arab Emirates in part for attempting to collect information on “Arab political dissidents living in the country.” 3 More recently, six people tied to the Russian government were arrested for preparing “armed actions targeting Chechen dissidents in Turkey.” 4 Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT) also foiled the attempted kidnapping of a former Iranian military pilot and detained Iranian agents.5 Moreover, interviews with members of some targeted diasporas inside Turkey done as part of the research for this project established that the Turkish police does offer short-term protection for certain individuals who are at risk of physical harm and does provide warnings about potential threats emanating from foreign states. Both of these practices, however, are highly contingent on the public profile of the targeted individual and Turkey’s relationship with the foreign government.6 These high-profile operations to prevent acts of transnational repression stand in stark contrast to what seems to be more routine security cooperation between Turkey’s government and other governments for the express purpose of silencing critical voices. In 2021, activists from Turkmenistan living in Turkey increasingly mobilized to protest the repressive tactics of the government of Turkmenistan. In response, the Turkish government tried to prevent peaceful protests in front of the Turkmen Consulate in Istanbul, arrested those who gathered, and failed to protect others from physical assault by consular staff.7 Turkish authorities then began harassing activists by detaining them and threatening them with deportation unless they stopped their political activities.8 The police reportedly targeted people based on a list of activists produced and distributed by the Turkmen Consulate.9 Both domestic and international nongovernmental organizations have concluded that the actions of Turkish authorities are in response to requests made by the Turkmen government.10 Turkey has also increasingly cracked down on political activism by Uyghurs. In 2009, then Prime Minister Erdoğan called the deaths of Uyghurs in Xinjiang a “genocide.” 11 More recently, however, Turkish authorities have been less vocal in their support of the Uyghurs and taken actions to tamp down political activism by the diaspora in Turkey. Protesters have been warned away from actions in front of the Chinese embassy12 and many Uyghurs have been arbitrarily detained and threatened with deportation.13 Often these actions have coincided with official state visits to Turkey by Chinese officials. Individuals participating in protests and even using popular pro-Uyghur hashtags online receive threats and are put under house arrest by Turkish authorities.14 Foreign policy goals influence domestic protections Turkey’s domestic security responses to transnational repression against members of various diasporas living in the country—the choice between aggressive protection, indifference, and active persecution—are driven by foreign policy considerations. The pressure on Turkmen activists coincided, for example, with the meeting of the Cooperation Council of the Turkic Speaking States (known as the Turkic Council) in Istanbul. In the past, Turkey has expressed the hope that Turkmenistan would become a full member of the organization.15 The situation of Uyghurs in Turkey has become more precarious in tandem with the evolution of the relationship between Turkey and China. Chinese economic investment in Turkey has grown significantly since 2016 through multibilliondollar loans and the development of Belt and Road Initiative projects.16 In 2017, the two countries signed an extradition agreement that could facilitate the return of Uyghurs to China if charged with terrorism.17 The treaty was ratified by China in late 2020 and remains unratified but under consideration by the Turkish parliament as the writing of this report. Although the Turkey’s officials continue to raise the issue of the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang with Chinese officials,18 the rhetoric is far more muted than it was a decade ago, and freedomhouse.org 3