is a growing need for emerging civil society actors inside Afghanistan, not only to fight for human rights, but also to work closely with their exiled counterparts, sharing knowledge and first-hand information from on the ground to meet advocacy purposes at the global arena. Yet, the respondents suggested that donors and INGOs are positioned rightly to help them identify and recruit these new defenders and civil society actors to ensure that activism continues, albeit limited, under the Taliban. There is also a widely shared perception from the Afghanistan’s HRDs in exile that INGOs are often hesitant in providing systematic, long-term support, mainly financial assistance, to exiled HRDs. It is primarily because INGOs perceive exiled defenders and their diaspora organisations as potential rivals. While INGOs recognise exiled defenders’ significant roles in advocacy and human rights work in general, they are also reluctant to fully empower them, fearing competition over resources and opportunities in the long run. For example, an Afghanistan’s HRD leading a diaspora organisation, and a representative from an INGO both equally described the existing context as such: “Donors an INGOs often hesitate to provide strategic funding to exiled HRDs, because possible competitions over resources among them would be unavoidable in the future. They also fear that such support could lead to rivalries, divert funds, and create conflicts among them.”63 As a result, INGOs and donor communities find themselves in a paradoxical position: they neither want to lose the invaluable contributions of exiled HRDs, nor are they willing to offer these defenders 63 Anonymous, “Afghanistan Exiled Human Rights Defender,” In an Interview with the Author, May 11, 2024. / Anonymous, “Representative of an INGO,” In an Interview with the Author, July 19, 2024. 26 strategic and long-term funding to thrive independently. Responses from donors’ and INGOs’ interviews indicated a mixed understanding. Some respondents believed that they have traditionally had a policy to put resources inside the country rather than support diaspora groups, while other INGOs and donors’ representatives placed more emphasis on the exiled HRDs to be supported and given a significant level of ownership to manage and implement the relevant human rights initiatives, mainly in a context when human rights work inside the country is a nearly impossible task. Conclusions The analysis and literature review demonstrate the sweeping closure of civic space as a result of the Taliban’s power seizure and repressive policies and directives since mid-August 2021. The repression has forced many HRDs to escape reprisals, seeking refuge in neighbouring countries, and some resettled in the EU, Canada, and USA. In transit countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, Afghanistan’s HRDs face deteriorating conditions, which among others include limited resources, heightened security and legal risks, forced deportation, and psycho-social hardships. These challenges are, yet, compounded by inadequate capacity of local and international organisations, including the UN agencies to support the defenders, leaving many of HRDs and their families in a state of limbo, unable to even send their children to school. The findings also show that those HRDs who have managed to resettle in the EU, Canada, and USA have their own set of problems with their human rights work, despite having a comparatively better security situation. The lack of a strategic financial support, combined with the absence of a strong political will from the host countries have placed the exiled HRDs