Introduction The efforts of authoritarian states to suppress dissent are not territorially limited. Over the past few years, there have been many notable cases of transnational repression—states implementing repressive policies to silence or coerce nationals located outside their territorial borders—including the Saudi killing of Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey,1 the assassination of Rwandan opposition members and dissidents in South Africa and elsewhere,2 and the harassment and intimidation of Chinese dissidents in Canada and the United States.3 While transnational repression is not a new phenomenon, such practices are expanding through the market growth of digital technologies and the spread of Internet connectivity, among other factors.4 This digital dimension of transnational repression—which we refer to as digital transnational repression—is rapidly becoming the cornerstone of everyday transnational repression and is a threat to the rights and freedoms of dissidents and activists who are living in exile. In this report, we describe how activists and dissidents living in Canada are impacted by digital transnational repression. We conclude that digital transnational repression has a serious impact on these communities, including their ability to undertake transnational advocacy work related to human rights. Yet, there is little support for victims who experience such targeting and policy efforts by the Canadian government to date have been insufficient. This finding is troubling, considering that the Trudeau government purports to welcome migrants and refugees to Canada and has made the promotion of democracy and human rights a cornerstone of its political platform. While the government has begun to address the threat of foreign interference in Canada—a term broad enough to capture digital transnational repression—its focus has primarily been on digital threats related to Canadian democratic institutions, economic interests, and critical infrastructure. The protection of the rights and freedoms of migrants and refugees appears to be of little concern. 1 BBC News (2021), “Jamal Khashoggi: All You Need to Know About the Saudi Journalist’s Death,” BBC News (24 February 2021) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45812399>. 2 Abu-Bakarr Jalloh (2021), “Rwanda: The Mysterious Deaths of Political Opponents,” DW (15 September 2021) <https://www.dw.com/en/rwanda-the-mysterious-deaths-of-political-opponents/a-59182275>; BBC News (2021), “Rwandan Seif Bamporiki Killed in South Africa,” BBC News (22 February 2021) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56119088>. 3 Catherine Porter (2019), “Chinese Dissidents Feel Heat of Beijing’s Wrath. Even in Canada,” New York Times (1 April 2019) <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/world/canada/china-dissidentharassment-sheng-xue.html>. 4 In this report, we consider transnational digital repression to include anything from social media harassment campaigns (such as public, semi-public, or private harassment on Twitter or Facebook) or online messaging and communications platforms (such as WhatsApp or Skype) to the use of sophisticated spyware and malware. In all cases, these activities feature a digital technology component on either the part of governments or those targeted by them.