CITIZEN LAB RESEARCH REPORT NO.151 29 repression might be appropriate. For example, in some jurisdictions, a specific crime of “refugee espionage” has been enacted to address the surveillance and harassment of refugee communities.104 Additionally, the Canadian government should investigate the possibility of criminal prosecutions that may help to limit the export or abuse of surveillance technologies by other states.105 y Ensure greater transparency in Canada’s dual-use export rules by publishing detailed information such as the names of exporting companies, the types of technology being exported, the destination of exported technology, and reasons for decisions to approve (or deny) export permits. The European Union recently increased transparency requirements on EU states in the context of dual-use exports.106 Doing so enables ongoing monitoring by civil society of the surveillance capacity of countries of export and the proliferation of dual-use surveillance technologies globally. y Strengthen and expand existing export rules by ensuring that new surveillance technologies are subject to dual-use controls, that there is a robust assessment of the human rights impacts of potential dual-use exports, that companies have to comply with due diligence requirements before export, and that export rules are robustly implemented. Mandating a human rights assessment before granting export licences may reduce the surveillance technologies that are available to authoritarian regimes. The European criminal law provisions such as national computer crime laws, although there are few examples of states undertaking such prosecutions specifically in relation to digital transnational repression. See Ron Deibert and Sarah McKune (2017), “Who’s Watching Little Brother?: A Checklist for Accountability in the Industry Behind Government Hacking,” Citizen Lab at 10–13 <https://citizenlab.ca/wp-content/ uploads/2017/03/citizenlab_whos-watching-little-brother.pdf>. As the authors note: “[l]acking, however, are coordinated campaigns against malicious actors specifically targeting civil society. Indeed, the frequent extraterritorial application of spyware technology against diaspora groups and other ‘hostile’ civil society actors beyond the physical reach of the state—some of which even incorporate ICT infrastructure in the jurisdiction of the target—raises serious questions about the resolve of governments to protect citizens from foreign espionage and information operations, and what sovereignty means in such a context.” 104 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (2014), “Comments from the UNHCR on the Memorandum of 6 December 2013, Proposing Criminalization of Refugee Espionage” <https://www.refworld.org/ country,,UNHCR,,FIN,,5829ad6c4,0.html>; Säkerhetspolisen (2017), “Man gripen för flyktingspionage,” Säkerhetspolisen (27 February 2017) <https://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/ovrigt/pressrum/aktuellt/ aktuellt/2017-02-27-man-gripen-for-flyktingspionage.html>. See also Swedish Security Service (2019), “Individual Charged on Suspicion of Refugee Espionage,” Swedish Security Service (6 October 2019) <https://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/en/swedish-security-service/about-us/press-room/current-events/ news/2019-11-06-individual-charged-on-suspicion-of-refugee-espionage.html>; However, the use of criminal law to pursue individuals who undertake surveillance against refugee communities needs to be done with extreme caution so it does not become a mechanism by which to deport refugee claimants. 105 For example, the United States Department of Justice has also pursued American ex-intelligence officials for facilitating the digital espionage capabilities of foreign states and noted that the prosecution was intended to dissuade the use of “hackers-for-hire.” See United States Department of Justice(2021), “Three Former US Intelligence Community and Military Personnel Agree to Pay More than 1.68 Million to Reserve Criminal Charges Arising from their Provision of Hacking-Related Services to a Foreign Government” United States Department of Justice (14 September 2021) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/ pr/three-former-us-intelligence-community-and-military-personnel-agree-pay-more-168-million>. 106 Beatrix Immenkamp (2021), “Review of Dual-Use Export Controls. European Parliamentary Research Service,” European Parliament at 3 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ BRIE/2016/589832/EPRS_BRI(2016)589832_EN.pdf>.