Section 4: Policy Recommendations to the Canadian Government for Addressing Digital Transnational Repression in Canada The interviews detailed in Section 3 show the serious impact that digital transnational repression has on Canadian communities. While the Canadian government has begun to address the threat of “foreign interference” in Canada, a term broad enough to capture digital transnational repression, the response has reflected a dominant concern for threats related to Canadian democratic institutions, economic interests, and critical infrastructure.96 Our review of existing government reports and statements suggests there has been limited effort to understand and document impacts of foreign interference on activists and dissidents who moved or fled to Canada. A focus on the specific concept of digital transnational repression (as well as transnational repression more broadly) could bring into greater focus the profound impacts that such authoritarian activities are having on the rights and freedoms of these communities. With these impacts in mind, we make the following initial recommendations to the Canadian government, which complement recommendations made by other organizations in Canada.97 96 For example, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act defines foreign influenced activities (considered to be “another term for foreign interference” by CSIS) as “activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person.” This definition of “foreign interference” is broad enough to capture activities that take place under digital transnational repression as defined at the outset of this report since such activities threaten Canadian values and interests such as human rights. See Canadian Security Intelligence Service (2021), “Foreign Interference Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process” <https:// www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/foreign-interference-threatto-canadas-democratic-process.html#toc2>; Public Safety Canada (2020), “Foreign Interference” <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/trnsprnc/brfng-mtrls/prlmntry-bndrs/20210325/027/ index-en.aspx?wbdisable=true>; Public Safety Canada (2021), “Foreign Interference” <https:// www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/trnsprnc/brfng-mtrls/prlmntry-bndrs/20210722/015/index-en.aspx>; Public Safety Canada (2020), “Response to the December 18, 2021 Motion on Foreign Interference” <https://www.passengerprotect-protectiondespassagers.gc.ca/cnt/trnsprnc/brfng-mtrls/prlmntrybndrs/20210625/27-en.aspx>; Canadian Security Intelligence Service (2020), “Espionage and Foreign Interference” <https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/espionage-andforeign-interference.html>. 97 In particular, see recommendations by Alliance Canada HK (2021), “In Plain Sight. Beijing’s Unrestricted Network of Foreign Influence in Canada,” Alliance Canada HK <https://alliancecanadahk.com/ wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ACHK_InPlainSight.pdf> [Alliance Canada HK, “In Plain Sight”]; Canadian Coalition on Human Rights in China and Amnesty International Canada (2020), “Harassment & Intimidation of Individuals in Canada Working on China-Related Human Rights Concerns,” Canadian Coalition on Human Rights in China & Amnesty International <https://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/ files/Canadian%20Coalition%20on%20Human%20Rights%20in%20China%20-%20Harassment%20 Report%20Update%20-%20Final%20Version.pdf> [Canadian Coalition on Human Rights in China, “Harassment & Intimidation”]. For a list of detailed policy recommendations in the US context