DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN EXILE Policy Responses to Transnational Repression espionage” or similar activities might help law enforcement address transnational repression. Study of this issue should include any possible negative spillover effects for refugees and migrants themselves. Create a screening process for diplomatic visas to prevent the entry or accreditation of diplomatic personnel with a history of harassing, intimidating, or harming their diasporas. Doing so could prevent transnational repression before it occurs. If diplomatic personnel already within the United States are found to be engaging in transnational repression, they should be designated personae non gratae and expelled, or held accountable under law when appropriate. Give extra scrutiny to export licensing applications from companies exporting products to countries whose governments engage in human rights abuses, especially those previously identified as perpetrators of transnational repression. The United States, Australia, Denmark, and Norway, supported by Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, recently announced the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative, intended to “help stem the tide of authoritarian government misuse of technology and promote a positive vision for technologies anchored by democratic values.” The United States also recently updated its licensing policy to restrict the export of items if there is “a risk that the items will be used to violate or abuse human rights.” When implementing these new initiatives and policies, the United States should consult research by Freedom House and other human rights organizations to determine whether there is a risk that the exported items could enable human rights abuses. Extra scrutiny should be given to the export of items that could enable transnational repression, especially if those items are intended for countries whose governments have been identified as perpetrators of transnational repression. Apply the voice, vote, and influence of the US government to limit the ability of Interpol member countries to target critics through misuse of Red Notices and other alerts. Interpol’s executive leadership includes representatives of governments notorious for perpetrating human rights abuses, including transnational repression. In November 2021, Ahmed Naser al-Raisi of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was elected president of Interpol; he is the subject of lawsuits filed in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, France, and Turkey accusing him of complicity in 14 @FreedomHouse torture inside UAE’s prisons. The UAE has also cooperated with other countries engaging in transnational repression and has engaged in transnational repression of its own. In that same election, Hu Binchen, deputy director general of the Chinese public security ministry, was elected to Interpol’s executive committee. The government of China conducts the most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression in the world. Al-Raisi and Hu join senior Interpol officials from Turkey and India, whose governments have also engaged in transnational repression. The United States is by far the largest statutory contributor to Interpol’s budget, and should leverage its contributions alongside other democracies to improve the functioning of Interpol, reduce opportunities for abuse, and support the candidacy of individuals for leadership positions who will enforce Interpol’s commitment to human rights. Prohibit the use of Interpol notices on their own to deny immigration or asylum benefits or conduct arrests. At present, ICE can and does use Interpol notices as proof of an immigration offence to invalidate an individual’s legal visa and to challenge a claim for asylum. Though it is unclear how frequently this occurs each year, this practice leads to detention and the risk of deportation. To ensure perpetrators are not able to mislead agents of the US government into aiding and abetting acts of transnational repression, law should require that notices issued by countries with which the US does not have an extradition agreement be independently verified before they are applied against individuals in the US on lawful visas or making a claim for asylum. Current Department of Justice policy prohibits the arrest of an individual solely on the basis of an Interpol Red Notice because these notices do not meet the probable cause standard of the Constitution. This policy should be codified. The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General should investigate the extent to which Interpol notices are used to invalidates visas or as probable cause to believe that a person applying for asylum has committed a serious nonpolitical crime. The report should include detailed information on the number of incidents where ICE or DHS use Interpol notices as evidence against a noncitizen in the United States, the countries that issued the notices that were used, the claims included in those notices, whether any of the cases would count as transnational repression, and detailed recommendations for ensuring that US immigration officials and judges are not unwittingly complicit in acts of transnational repression. #TransnationalRepression