12 Introduction billion to their home-countries by air, sea, and wire, 76 percent of which went to low- and middle-income countries (World Bank 2018). These remittances vastly outnumber official aid to these countries by a factor of three (Ratha et al. 2019). Even then, these figures do not account for the millions of dollars that move through informal channels, such as local agents and wire services, to the most remote locales (Horst 2008b, 2008c; Laakso and Hautaniemi 2014; Lyons and Mandaville 2012; Orjuela 2008). Remittances tie diaspora members to their homelands by reinforcing a sense of obligation to those left behind (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001). They also grant diasporas a disproportionate influence in home-country politics (Kapur 2010; Lainer-Vos 2013; Shain 2007). While most are used to support family members, remittances are also channeled into public works, charity, and political parties (Bada 2014; Duquette-Rury 2020; Horst 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2015; R. Smith 2006). For these reasons, sendingstate governments are increasingly wooing their diasporas by granting national members dual citizenship, out-of-country voting rights, and congressional seats, as well as by forming institutions to foment connectivity (Brand 2014; Gamlen 2014; Gamlen et al. 2017; Harpaz 2019; Ragazzi 2017). Their remittances can also make or break the peace by extending the duration of civil wars, funding reconstruction efforts, or both (Adamson 2013; Brinkerhoff 2011; Byman et al. 2001; Cederman et al. 2009; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Collier et al. 2003; Orjuela 2008; Shain 2002; H. Smith and Stares 2007). Diasporas are further primed to become transnational political players because of their privileged “positionality” (Koinova 2012) vis-à-vis those left behind (Germano 2009). Their members often include wealthy, well-educated, and highly skilled activists who go abroad to study at globally ranked universities. Equipped with multilingualism and multiculturalism, “cosmopolitan patriots” (Appiah 1997) and second-generation youth often literally speak the languages of insiders and outsiders alike (M. Hess and Korf 2014). They send what Levitt (1998) calls “social remittances” homeward in the form of foreign cultural practices, knowledge, and skills (Wescott and Brinkerhoff 2006). By circulating ideas that promote civil, political, and human rights, these members enact transnational citizenship and diffuse liberal norms (Boccagni et al. 2016; Finn and Momani 2017; Lacroix et al. 2016). Phillip Ayoub’s (2016: 34) study of Polish activism in Germany from 1990 through the 2000s, for instance, shows that expatriates engage in “norm brokerage” by translating international norms to audiences at home and, in turn, connecting outside supporters with home-country activists. Their positioning between social worlds makes them powerful proponents of liberal change (Brinkerhoff 2016; McAdam et al. 2001). It follows that diaspora activists have access to the rhetoric, tactical adaptations, and strategical savvy to remake the homeland in their image (Shain 1999). Researchers also argue that elites are especially primed to become powerful influencers at home (Guarnizo et al. 2003) because their privileges https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009272148 Published online by Cambridge University Press