42 Diaspora Activism and the Dynamics of Voice external attention grants activists leverage and influence (Bob 2005; J. Smith 2004; Tsutsui 2018). When diaspora movements receive what Betts and Jones (2016: 9) call “external animation,” they become activated and encouraged by these powerholders to express voice. Extending these claims, I argue that diaspora interventions are shaped by the degree of geopolitical support they receive from their host-country governments, states bordering the home-country, international institutions, and the media. Whether these geopolitical powerholders support diaspora activists depends on a range of factors, including officials’ security and economic interests, their ideologies and professed values, and institutional missions. Outside actors are also more likely to incorporate diaspora movements into their policymaking and practices when activists can fill in gaps in outsiders’ knowledge about their homelands. Western journalists seeking to report from the front lines, for instance, may rely on diaspora brokers for access and language interpretation; state actors similarly rely on activists to provide intelligence and the legal and moral justifications for foreign intervention (Moss 2020). The geopolitical support of states is especially important when diasporas seek to transfer resources across national borders. Diaspora members from conflict zones face hurdles in sending remittances when banks seek to “de-risk” their dealings and governments block remittances, citing reasons of counterterrorism (Fadlalla 2019; Gordon and El Taraboulsi-McCarthy 2018). Just as Palestinian Americans have been accused of supporting terrorism abroad for their charitable efforts (Pennock 2017), the current war on terror poses significant obstacles to organizing even for basic humanitarian relief among South Asian, Middle Eastern, African, and Muslim communities (Chaudhary 2021; Horst and van Hear 2002). Because transnational ties embed diaspora members in geopolitical conflicts, persons accused of channeling remittances to the so-called wrong cause can face severe penalties. Accordingly, diaspora members’ abilities to move resources homeward – particularly to isolated places in the world’s periphery – will be severely compromised unless they gain the geopolitical support of gatekeepers. 1.6 conclusion In closing, the primary contribution of this book is a process-driven framework for explaining anti-authoritarian voice after exit. My argument, in summary, is that when home-country ties subject diaspora members to transnational repression and conflict transmission, anti-regime voice will be weak. When quotidian disruptions upend these transnational deterrents, diaspora members will become empowered to capitalize on host-country political opportunities and express voice against regimes in word and deed. The extent to which they intervene on behalf of rebellion and relief is then mitigated by two additional additive forces of resource conversion and geopolitical support. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009272148 Published online by Cambridge University Press