Freedom House By contrast, the notes on Turkey provide a thorough accounting of repression against people affiliated with the Gülen movement, including Turkey’s extradition requests, forced disappearances, passport cancellation, and coercion –by proxy of alleged Gulen supporters abroad.33 Similarly, a China note on Uighurs in Xinjian includes a small section titled, “Restrictions of those outside of China,” which identifies problems such as passport confiscation, surveillance, and coercion by proxy.34 Migration officials are also not encouraged to seek out further knowledge to supplement the incomplete countryof-origin information they are provided. An investigation by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration found that “training did not adequately equip [asylum decision makers] with the skills to conduct a substantive interview or make decisions.” 35 The report also describes a “refusal culture,” and trainers have allegedly told asylum decision makers that their performance would partly be evaluated on their refusing more applications than they grant.36 Another problem the report identified is that staff felt pressure to meet their caseload targets, at the expense of thoroughly considering each individual case. Extradition requests and cooperation with foreign governments The UK has strong provisions against unlawful extraditions. Circumstances that bar extradition include the possibility that the individual will face capital punishment in their home country and “improperly motivated” requests where there is a risk of “prejudice to the requested person,” which offers a safeguard against politically motivated extraditions. Courts must also consider whether “extradition would be disproportionate or would be incompatible with the requested person’s human rights.” 37 The UK has extradition agreements with several countries that have perpetrated physical transnational repression including Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Libya, India, Nigeria, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. However, extradition requests from all non-EU countries are reviewed by the secretary of state before being passed to a judge for their decision whether to issue a warrant. If a warrant is issued, extradition hearings take place before a court, and eventually the secretary of state is involved in the final decision of whether to order an extradition. Extradition requests from governments that do not have a treaty with the UK are first vetted by the secretary of state.38 Outside of extradition treaties, the UK has mutual legal assistance (MLA) agreements with a number of perpetrators of transnational repression, including China, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam.39 These agreements usually concern requests for assistance or information in criminal cases. The requests are processed through the Home Office and may involve search warrants. UK government guidance requires a human rights assessment when considering an MLA and lists political motivation as grounds for refusal.40 Nevertheless, the judicial oversight that plays a centra role in consideration of extradition requests is absent from the MLA assessment process. People interviewed for this report expressed concerns that not enough resources were directed towards MLA review processes to ensure protection from exploitation. Processes for handling Interpol requests are inconsistent. As spurious Interpol notices are a tool commonly used for detaining and extraditing opponents abroad, gaps in how they are treated open the door to transnational repression. With the exception of those initiated by a handful of the UK’s democratic partners, Interpol notices and diffusions are not grounds for arrest in the UK; they must first be reviewed and produce a domestic warrant as outlined in the process for extradition requests.41 However, requests for information via Interpol appear to have a lower standard of review. The National Crime Agency centralizes intake of Interpol notices and diffusions and disperses them to relevant law enforcement agencies, which then have the discretion to execute the request, subject to any data sharing agreement. Processes for handling Interpol requests are inconsistent. The experience of Zaina Erhaim, a Syrian journalist and activist, reveals another loophole in intergovernmental cooperation that can facilitate transnational repression. In 2016, the Syrian government was successfully able to co-opt British authorities into detaining Erhaim by reporting her passport as stolen. Border police detained and questioned Erhaim, who lived in Turkey at the time, and confiscated her passport. The Home Office responded to the incident by saying that it is obligated to confiscate passports that are reported as stolen.42 freedomhouse.org 7