Under the “terrorism exception” to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, individuals can sue US-designated state sponsors of terrorism—currently Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba—for extraterritorial acts including torture, extrajudicial killing, and hostage-taking. But that is only possible if the plaintiffs were US nationals at the time the act occurred. Congress could amend the statute to allow individuals to sue if they are US nationals or lawful permanent residents at the time the claim is brought, allowing newly arrived dissidents who are the target of transnational repression to hold the governments of their origin countries accountable. Staying on the topic of exceptions to the FSIA, the Homeland and Cyber Threat (HACT) Act has been introduced and re-introduced before the House since 2019 and would partly address transnational repression by allowing dissidents who are US nationals to sue foreign states that launch cyberattacks against them. However, this would not address the problem of accountability against private companies—who facilitate the sale of spyware used against dissidents. A series of judgments from the US Supreme Court have restricted the possibilities for corporate liability and this negatively impacts the ability of US-based non-citizen dissidents to sue companies involved in surveillance. These barriers to accountability in US domestic law must be removed. 2- How to address transnational repression from US allies versus from US adversaries. Another critical aspect of this problem is to how to identify and address threats posed to US citizens and residents by US allies, not adversaries. A quick glance at the FBI website to report instances of transnational repression shows a list of DOJ indictments against individuals from China, Russia, and Iran but there is nothing to indicate that these threats can also come from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Rwanda, and even India. Transnational repression is not only carried out by US adversaries, it is also carried out by authoritarian governments with strategic partnerships with the US conditioned on aid packages, arms deals, political support, and trade relationships. These authoritarian states have the same interest other authoritarian states do in silencing dissidents abroad, and their friendly relationship with the US does not deter them from targeting dissidents on US soil. The nature of the relationship between governments does however affect how confident the victims and impacted communities feel in coming forward to law enforcement here in the US to inform authorities of the problem. In consultations I have had with dissidents from countries friendly with the US, they have expressed fear or reluctance in approaching US authorities to detail the threats they face. There is a pervasive feeling that US authorities may not defend their interests in the same way they would if the perpetrators were from an “adversary” country like Russia, China, or Iran—where US foreign policy has taken a clear position in defending the interests of Americans with no trade-offs.