AS/Jur (2023) 17 Magnitskiy engaged in a worldwide campaign aimed at holding to account Mr Magnitsky’s killers and enacting laws providing for targeted sanctions, was also harrassed and persecuted by the Russian authorities, by repeated attempts to abuse Interpol’s Red Notice and Diffusion procedures. 43 34. Vladimir Osechkin, who participated as an expert in a hearing on the issue of systemic torture before our committee in March 2023, was placed on a wanted list by Russia after leaking a large archive of documents, photos and videos documenting rape and torture of inmates in Russian prisons by prison officials. He had sought asylum in France after fleeing Russia and has been living under French police protection. He has received death threats and has indicated that he was the target of a possible assassination attempt at his home in France. 44 35. The Freedom House 2021 report attributed to Russia 32 documented cases of physical transnational repression (with 20 cases having a Chechen nexus), which include assaults, detentions, unlawful deportations, and renditions, mainly in Europe. It counted 7 of 26 assassinations or assassination attempts since 2014 attributed to Russia, which, according to Freedom House, “[at] a minimum, in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Germany, and the United Kingdom, … has shown a willingness to kill perceived enemies abroad”. Mr Frank Schwabe (Germany, SOC) referred to some examples of transnational repression targeting Chechen exiles in his report “The continuing need to restore human rights and the rule of law in the North Caucasus region “45. 36. A clear systemic pattern, even an official Russian policy, to pursue dissidents abroad can be identified. Ukraine lodged an inter-State application against Russia before the European Court of Human Rights alleging an administrative practice consisting of State-authorised targeted assassination operations against perceived opponents in Russia and on the territory of other States, including other member States of the Council of Europe, as well as an administrative practice of failing to investigate these operations and of deliberately mounting cover-up operations.46 It remains for the Court to determine whether such a practice can be proven and the possible violations of the Convention involved. In my view there are sufficient grounds to consider that Russia has implemented and continues to implement an official “transnational persecution programme”. 37. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has led to increased repression within its borders. The persecution and criminalisation of anti-war protesters and the “partial mobilisation” of men for military service has pushed many to flee the country and to be potential victims of Russian transnational repression. For instance, law enforcement officers in Kazakhstan repeatedly detained Evgeniya Baltatarova, a journalist from Russia’s Buryat region, who was placed on a wanted list by Moscow for disseminating “fake news” about the Russian army. Her detention was explained by authorities as complying with the Minsk Convention. Kazakhstan also deported Mikhail Zhilin, an officer who had fled military conscription, because his name appeared on a wanted list for “desertion”. He was deported after his claim to asylum was denied. 47 People fleeing forced military service in the Russian army may face obstacles applying for asylum in Europe and be more vulnerable to transnational repression. 3.2. Türkiye 38. Freedom House included Türkiye in its list of States with a long arm of transnational repression. The extent was not comparable to Russia, but still, Türkiye employed some of the tools of transnational repression. The Turkish campaign was found to rely on renditions 48 and abuse of Interpol Red Notices49, and to be “remarkable for its intensity, its geographic reach, and the suddenness with which it escalated [since] the coup attempt […] in July 2016…”50. After blaming Fethullah Gülen for the attempted coup, Türkiye implemented a Resolution 2252 (2019) “Sergei Magnitsky and beyond – fighting impunity by targeted sanctions”, paragraphs 5 and 13.5, based on a report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 14661 (rapporteur: Lord Donald Anderson, United Kingdom, SOC). See also B. Browder, Red Notice: A True Story of High Finance, Murder, and One Man’s Fight for Justice (2015). 43 44 Vladimir Osechkin: France investigates 'death threats' against Russian prison rights activist | Euronews. See Mr. Schwabe’s report on North Caucasus, Resolution 2445 (2022), para. 14 on Interpol Red Notices, and Report Doc. 15544. 46 Ukraine v. Russian Federation (IX), no 10691/21, press release of the Court of 23 February 2021. 47 Freedom House, Still Not Safe: Transnational Repression in 2022, 2023. 48 Stockholm Center for Freedom, Turkey’s Transnational Repression: Abduction, Rendition and Forcible Return of Erdoğan Critics (2021). 49 Stockholm Center for Freedom, Turkey’s Abuse of INTERPOL: How Erdoğan Weaponized the International Criminal Police Organization for Transnational Repression (2021) 50 Freedom House, Linzer and Schenkkan, 2021, op.cit, p. 38. 45 13