DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN EXILE Policy Responses to Transnational Repression approach to terrorism and extremism. Similarly, the German government has taken greater interest in the foreign funding of mosques in recent years, as it views foreign funding as a risk factor for radicalization.13 In 2018, Germany’s foreign ministry began requesting that Gulf states register donations or other contributions to mosques in Germany. Conflating defense against radicalization with protection for individuals recasts potential victims as security threats, which can contribute to Islamophobia. Counterproductively, this approach also leaves people of Muslim origin, who are among the most vulnerable to transnational repression,14 at even greater risk of harm. Foreign and domestic information sharing German authorities have at times alerted individuals believed to be under surveillance by foreign states and provided police protection to people under threat, though the processes triggering these actions and the frequency of their use are unclear.15 Such alerts rely on extensive information sharing within the government, and the complex coordination required by Germany’s federal structure introduces room for error. Intelligence sharing and cooperation between governments is a risk factor for transnational repression. However, intelligence sharing and cooperation between governments is a risk factor for transnational repression. Publicly available reporting provides some insight into information sharing and protection in several cases related to Turkey’s transnational repression. The Turkish government is one of the most prolific perpetrators of transnational repression globally and is active in Germany. It primarily targets people allegedly affiliated with the Gülen movement, which President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan holds responsible for the 2016 coup attempt and labels as a terrorist organization. 16 Two Turkish journalists in exile report that German police continuously evaluate their safety and adjust the level of protection they receive accordingly. 17 In February 2017, Turkish intelligence services requested German cooperation in their surveillance of hundreds of Turks 4 @FreedomHouse living in Germany who were allegedly supporters of the Gülen movement. Turkish authorities shared detailed information with the BND leadership, including names, addresses, phone numbers, and clandestinely acquired photographs. 18 Despite Turkey’s efforts, Germany’s intelligence services do not view Gülen supporters as terrorists, and members of government at multiple levels expressed alarm about surveillance occurring on German soil. In an example of successful coordination across multiple levels of government, the BND alerted numerous relevant government offices, including the BfV, the federal criminal police office, and the federal prosecutor general of the Turkish request. Local offices, including state police, were tasked with alerting the affected individuals that they were being surveilled and might face reprisals if they travel to Turkey. Roughly two thirds of physical incidents of transnational repression involve cooperation between origin and host states, or cooption—origin states using the host state’s institutions to reach an individual, often by leveraging allegations of terrorist activity) and cooperation between origin and host states.19 Authorities’ decision not to cooperate with Turkish intelligence services’ requests about Gülen supporters, and instead to protect the named individuals, suggests that German awareness of transnational repression and information sharing across federal and state-level authorities translates to resilience against cooption in certain cases. Accountability and foreign policy Germany’s efforts to impose accountability for transnational repression are inconsistent. As in the Khangoshvili case, some attacks have been dealt with through the German judicial system. For example, the 2017 state-sponsored kidnapping of a Vietnamese asylum seeker, Trinh Xuân Thanh, and his companion resulted in a multiyear prison sentence for a Vietnamese man who assisted in the abduction.20 Over the last 10 years, Germany has expelled diplomats in relation to three instances of transnational repression that occurred within Germany. A total of four Russian diplomats were expelled over the course of the Khangoshvili affair, 21 and two Vietnamese diplomats were expelled in the aftermath of Thanh’s abduction. 22 The third was in 2012, when authorities ousted four Syrian diplomats in relation to surveillance of Syrians in Germany. 23 Beyond expelling diplomats, itself a rare move, Germany’s existing accountability mechanisms are limited. Germany does not apply sanctions unilaterally, but it adheres to UN and EU #TransnationalRepression