An Egyptian women rights defender observed that trainings were not always appropriate for all age groups: “I had one training in digital security and I definitely need to do more. There were a lot of young people in the training who were more advanced and I didn’t dare to ask questions all the time because I did not want to take everybody’s time and be the stupid person in the class. I definitely need a lower level beginner class and I need to learn this because now I always have to rely on someone else and find someone to ask questions I have about digital security.”102 PRACTICING DIGITAL SECURITY Respondents identified a few key tools and practices they considered important for their protection. Email encryption and encrypted messaging services such as Signal were frequently mentioned, as was the use of two-step verification to protect email accounts against intrusions and password theft. Syrian interviewees, in particular, emphasized the importance of using VPNs to protect Internet connections. Several respondents also explained that they refrained from using Facebook messenger for communications, emphasizing the risks of Facebook profiles for monitoring and social engineering. Nevertheless, especially in Egypt, Facebook and its messenger app remain in prominent use as activists explained it was difficult to convince people to use other platforms. Indeed, an activist who left Facebook for security purposes started to feel “disconnected” from events and networks.103 Several of the security models outlined by respondents reflect the complex techno-political environment in which they must navigate. A Syrian photojournalist, for instance, said she created a specific email account for every new professional activity to distribute her information over different accounts and profiles. And a Syrian journalist based in Turkey explained how his security precautions depended on the contacts he was dealing with: “When I call a journalist in the regime area, they use fake names and I also use a fake name. We connect by email, they use VPN, I don’t. The danger is for them, not for me. I don’t say anything about them, nobody knows their names. When a publication asks me about the name of my source, like who is this journalist, I don’t answer. I rather cancel my article. The same thing for contacts in ISIS area before. For areas under control of the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), I use a fake name to be safe, because I am in Turkey, and they use their real name, no problem for them.”104 The journalist reported using four different email addresses (two of them protected by two-step verification) and two separate computers (one personal and one for his job), while also refraining from using his phone for anything related to work. The interviews reveal that activists often must fend for themselves on the digital front lines. Under threat from repressive regimes, they have to make decisions on risk mitigation in their daily routines on an individual level. For transnational activism, the complex, often opaque, technologies of digital communication are certainly indispensable. But an overreliance on purely technical solutions for privacy and data protection risks exacerbating activist dependency on technical experts and an unequal distribution of knowledge and resources. Moreover, on a technical level, knowledge within civil society is usually quickly outpaced by that of the state and private sector.105 102 Interview E12, March 2019. 103 Interview E4, November 2018. 104 Interview S13, January 2019. 105 Gürses, S., Kundnani, A., & Van Hoboken, J. (2016). Crypto and empire: The contradictions of counter-surveillance advocacy. Media, Culture & Society, 38(4), 576-590; Kazansky, B. (2015). Privacy, responsibility, and human rights activism. The Fibreculture Journal 26 (Entanglements–Activism and Technology). 30