Freedom House “Julian Borger,” “The Man Who Said No: How Iran Coerces Expats to Inform on Friends,” Guardian, August 21, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/21/ the-man-who-said-no-how-iran-coerces-expats-to-inform-on-friends. “Omer Güney, assassin présumé de trois militantes kurdes à Paris, meurt avant son procès” [Omer Güney, suspected murderer of three Kurdish activists in Paris, dies before trial], 20 Minutes, December 17, 2016, https:// www.20minutes.fr/societe/1982627-20161217-omer-gney-assassin-presumetrois-militantes-kurdes-paris-meurt-avant-proces. 257 272 “Iran Halts Execution of Three Protesters After Online Campaign,” British Broadcasting Corporation, July 19, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-53463685. 273 258 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, “Abusive Use of the Interpol System: The Need for More Stringent Legal Safeguards,” March 29, 2017, https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en. asp?fileid=23524&lang=en. 259 Masih Alinejad, “Iranian Officials Have Declared They Want to Kidnap Me. It’s Happened to Others Before,” Washington Post, August 10, 2020, https://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/08/10/iranian-officials-have-declared-theywant-kidnap-me-its-happened-others-before/. 260 Reporters Without Borders, “Open Letter about Threats to Iranian Journalists in Six EU Countries and US,” January 22, 2020, https://rsf.org/en/news/ open-letter-about-threats-iranian-journalists-six-eu-countries-and-us#. 261 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Iran: Targeting of Journalists Threatens Freedom of Press, Say UN Experts,” March 11, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. aspx?NewsID=25706&LangID=E. 262 Marcus Michaelsen, “Silencing Across Borders: Transnational Repression and Digital Threats Against Exiled Activists From Egypt, Syria, and Iran,” Hivos, 2019, https://www.hivos.org/assets/2020/02/SILENCING-ACROSS-BORDERS-MarcusMichaelsen-Hivos-Report.pdf. 263 Reporters Without Borders, “Prison Sentences for Relatives of Iranian Journalists,” July 22, 2020, https://rsf.org/en/news/ prison-sentences-relatives-iranian-journalists. 264 Michael Lipin and Ramin Haghjoo, “Turkey-Based Iranian Dissident Says Iran Sentenced Her to Prison for Protesting in 2019,” November 2, 2020, https://www. voanews.com/middle-east/voa-news-iran/turkey-based-iranian-dissident-saysiran-sentenced-her-prison-protesting; Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Targeting of Dual Citizens, Foreigners,” September 26, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/ news/2018/09/26/iran-targeting-dual-citizens-foreigners. 265 266 Freedom House interview with Iranian exile, November 2019. Collin Anderson and Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Cyber Threat: Espionage, Sabotage, and Revenge,” January 4, 2018, https://carnegieendowment. org/2018/01/04/iran-s-cyber-threat-espionage-sabotage-and-revenge-pub-75134. 267 Elias Groll, “Spear Phishing in Tehran,” Foreign Policy, August 9, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/09/spear-phishing-in-tehran/. 268 “German Interior Ministry Bans Biker Gang Osmanen Germania BC,” Deutsche Welle, July, 10, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/ german-interior-ministry-bans-biker-gang-osmanen-germania-bc/a-44595773. Chase Winter, “Turkish Imam Spy Affair in Germany Extends Across Europe,” Deutsche Welle, February 16, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/turkishimam-spy-affair-in-germany-extends-across-europe/a-37590672; Ahmet Erdi Öztürk and Semiha Sözeri, “Diyanet as a Turkish Foreign Policy Tool: Evidence from the Netherlands and Bulgaria,” Politics & Religion 11, no. 3 (March 2, 2018), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-religion/article/diyanetas-a-turkish-foreign-policy-tool-evidence-from-the-netherlands-and-bulgaria/6 7BCDC6BCF8A801E66CD5535DAB33CF1. 274 Nate Schenkkan, “The Remarkable Scale of Turkey’s ‘Global Purge,’” Foreign Affairs, January 29, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ turkey/2018-01-29/remarkable-scale-turkeys-global-purge. 275 In the 2000s under the first governments of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Islamic movement of Fethullah Gülen became a powerful force that backed the government through its media outlets and educational activities. Many of its members populated the ranks of Turkey’s large civil service, from universities to prosecutors’ and judges’ offices. The movement’s domestic success was backed by its expansive global activities, especially in education: a network of thousands of primary schools, high schools, and universities in dozens of countries spread the movement’s ideas and provided revenue for its other activities. In many ways, its global presence acted as a soft-power arm of Erdoğan’s governments, representing Turkey abroad at a time when the AKP still mistrusted the secularists it believed dominated the Foreign Ministry. The movement and the government began to fall out in 2012 and decisively split in December 2013. When the coup attempt occurred on July 15, 2016, the Turkish government immediately blamed the Gülen movement. Evidence against some high-level members of the movement is credible but circumstantial. The government has gone far beyond that, asserting that all people associated with the movement, which may number in the hundreds of thousands or millions, were responsible, even those who had merely studied at Gülenist schools, held accounts at Gülenist banks, or used allegedly Gülenist messaging apps to communicate. 276 Kemal Karadağ, “Firari FETÖ’cüler için 105 ülkeyle yürütülen iade trafiği” [Return traffic with 105 countries for fugitive FETÖ members], Anadolu Agency, July 13, 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/15-temmuz-darbe-girisimi/ firari-fetoculer-icin-105-ulkeyle-yurutulen-iade-trafigi/1908422. 277 “Duyurular” [Announcements], Terör Arananlar, October 3, 2020, http://www.terorarananlar.pol.tr/duyurular. 278 Marcus Michaelsen, “Silencing Across Borders: Transnational Repression and Digital Threats Against Exiled Activists From Egypt, Syria, and Iran,” Hivos, 2019, https://www.hivos.org/assets/2020/02/SILENCING-ACROSS-BORDERS-MarcusMichaelsen-Hivos-Report.pdf. 269 Sinem Adar, “Rethinking Political Attitudes of Migrants from Turkey and Their Germany-Born Children,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_ papers/2019RP07_ada.pdf. 270 Bahar Baser, “Turkish-Kurdish Conflict Spills Over into Europe,” The Conversation, October 16, 2015, https://theconversation.com/ turkish-kurdish-conflict-spills-over-into-europe-47610. 271 “War on Terror,” Daily Sabah, accessed December 30, 2020, https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror. 279 Sinan Balcikoca and Mirac Kaya, “Turkish Deputy PM Praises Anti-FETO Op in Kosovo,” Anadolu Agency, April 2, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/ turkish-deputy-pm-praises-anti-feto-op-in-kosovo/1106396. 280 Satuk Bugra Kutlugun, “Suspected FETO Bankroller Returned to Turkey from Sudan,” Anadolu Agency, November 21, 2017, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/ africa/suspected-feto-bankroller-returned-to-turkey-from-sudan/980800. 281 freedomhouse.org 71