30 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL WAR Union has taken steps towards ensuring such a strengthened and expanded export review system.107 y Ensure that the use of any surveillance technologies by Canadian intelligence and law enforcement bodies in Canada complies with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and international human rights law. Ensure that procurement of such technology is transparent and subject to public consultation and that government agencies and institutions do not import or use surveillance technology from companies associated with human rights abuses. In leading by example, the Canadian government—as well as other democratic states—have an opportunity to begin to articulate clear norms regarding when and how surveillance technology is going to be used by state actors, which detracts from authoritarian states’ ability to argue that such technologies can be used by any state in any manner. Support the Victims of Digital Transnational Repression y Create a dedicated government agency that is independent from CBSA, CSIS, or law enforcement to provide support for victims of transnational repression and to conduct research to better understand the scale and impact of these activities on the exercise of human rights in Canada.108 Ensure that government institutions coordinate how they address transnational repression and focus on the protection of the rights and freedoms of communities in Canada. These reforms could help address concerns raised in the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians’ 2019 report, which highlights that security and intelligence organizations do not share a common understanding of the threat, including its gravity and most common manifestations.109 As a result, Canada has been slow to react.110 Further, the report notes that government responses have been “piecemeal, responding to specific instances of foreign interference but leaving unaddressed the many other areas where Canadian 107 Ibid. On due diligence rules, see Siena Anstis and RJ Reid (2021), “The Adverse Human Rights Impacts of Canadian Technology Companies: Reforming Export Control with the Introduction of Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence,” Canadian Journal of Law and Technology. 108 See also Canadian Coalition on Human Rights in China, “Harassment & Intimidation” at 50–51. For example, Public Safety Canada “has established a Federal, Provincial and Territorial Community of Practice on Economic-based national security threats to bring together key officials at the working level from across these jurisdictions to discuss national security threats that arise through economic activities. This includes, for example, threats arising from foreign direct investment, trade and exports, and the transfer or acquisition of Canadian intellectual property, knowledge, rights and licenses.” A similar effort in relation to digital transnational repression has not been undertaken, despite the fact that such activity threatens and impairs the fundamental rights of Canadians and, more broadly, may facilitate understanding and responding to economic-based national security threats. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (2019), “Annual Report,” at 109 <https:// www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2020-03-12-ar/annual_report_2019_public_en.pdf> [NSICOP 2019 Annual Report]. 109 NSICOP 2019 Annual Report. 110 Ibid at 102.