Section 3: Digital Transnational Repression in Canada Between 2020 and 2021, we conducted exploratory interviews to better understand how digital transnational repression impacts activists and dissidents living in Canada, which is generally not studied enough. We interviewed 18 individuals, all of whom resided in Canada and had moved or fled to Canada from another country (their country of origin), and self-reported being or having been politically or socially engaged in relation to their country of origin. Six participants self-identified as female, 11 self-identified as male, and one participant did not provide their gender. Participants self-identified as coming from a range of geographical regions and countries, including Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Tibet, Hong Kong, China, Rwanda, Iran, Afghanistan, East Turkestan, and Balochistan.85 The average age of participants was 37 years old.86 All participants were college- or university-educated or were enrolled in a college or university study program. Participants who were not students reported working in areas that included journalism, the private and non-profit sectors, and the civil society sector. Participants left their countries of origin for various reasons, including family reasons (for example, leaving as a young child), the inability to make a life in their country of origin, and/or flight from persecution. In most cases, the participants’ departure (or that of their family if they left as a young child) was linked to persecution or fear of persecution by authorities in their countries of origin. Interviews explored a range of issues, such as the participants’ activism in their country of origin and in Canada, their use of digital technologies in both locations, their feelings about whether they had been digitally targeted in Canada or before arriving in Canada, and how this targeting impacted them. Transnational digital repression tactics against participants ranged broadly but included hacking and phishing, account takeovers, troll and bot campaigns on social media, online threats, and disinformation campaigns. Participants stated that they adopted some digital practices in an attempt to protect themselves.87 85 We have referred to the participants’ country of origin based on what they self-reported this to be. For example, a participant who has self-reported as being from Balochistan will be described as a “participant from Balochistan” even though the region of Balochistan is not internationally recognized as its own country and is considered part of Pakistan. In some cases, we have omitted the participant’s country of origin to protect their identity. 86 One participant did not want to provide their age and has been omitted from this number. 87 Such digital security practices included using separate personal and work email accounts, using several devices and phone numbers, using encrypted platforms and VPNs, employing code language when communicating online, not opening links in direct messages, regularly changing passwords and activating 2FA, turning off location-tracking in applications, and deleting applications that they believed their country of origin could potentially use against them.