12 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL WAR Repression of Family Members and Friends in the Country of Origin Digital technologies also facilitate coercion-by-proxy through the intimidation of family members who remain in the country of origin.74 In particular, “the transnationalization of politics has been accompanied by the transnationalization of family ties, social relations, and social networks, which perversely has provided an additional source of leverage for states to engage in transnational repression.”75 In other words, digital surveillance provides a mechanism by which authoritarian states can identify relationships between family members and colleagues in the country of origin and dissidents and activists outside.76 An example of this coercion-by-proxy activity emerges from China, where a Chinese activist abroad reported that the Chinese government used Skype to call him while the authorities were in the same room as their family members back in China.77 Similarly, in an attempt to have an Iranian engineer based in the United States spy for them, Iranian authorities in Tehran threatened the engineer’s sister, who also received a summons for her brother to report to the Iranian courts for questioning.78 Moreover, when an Iranian man who was living in Canada refused the Iranian Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau’s request to delete Instagram posts condemning the shooting down of Ukrainian International Airlines Flight 752, his family in Iran received a call from Iranian intelligence services.79 Iranian authorities’ questioning of family in Iran is also proving a popular mechanism to target Iranian journalists in exile. In a survey, 69 of 102 participants who were Iranian journalists living abroad reported that the Iranian government had questioned, harassed, or threatened one or more of their relatives in Iran.80 Another example relates to digital threats that Uyghurs living abroad faced when, using WeChat, their relatives were employed as proxies by the Chinese authorities.81 Syrian dissidents living abroad have also reported that their families have been detained and tortured because of the dissident’s activities outside the country.82 Similarly, in the 74 Adamson and Tsourapas, “Coercion-by-Proxy.” 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Gilbert, “Chinese Police.” 78 Wallis Snowdon (2020), “Edmonton Software Engineer Says Iranian Regime Attempted to Make Him Their Spy,” CBC News (27 August 2020) <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/edmontonsoftware-engineer-arrest-iranian-regime-informant-1.5700744>. 79 Steven Chase (2020), “Victims of Foreign-State-Sponsored Harassment in Canada Recount Threats of Rape, Murder and Harm to Families,” The Globe and Mail (26 November 2020) <https://www. theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-victims-of-foreign-state-sponsored-harassment-in-canadarecount/>. 80 Sirwan Kajjo, “Secondary Targets: When You Can’t Punish a Journalist, Family Will Do Just Fine,” VOA News [undated] <https://projects.voanews.com/press-freedom/secondary-targets/>. 81 Schenkkan and Linzer, Freedom House Report at 18. 82 Amnesty International (2011), “The Long Reach of the Mukhabarat: Violence and Harassment Against