CITIZEN LAB RESEARCH REPORT NO.151 11 instance, reported that the Ethiopian government’s surveillance of his online activism through the use of FinFisher spyware “made him feel insecure and very uncomfortable, as if he was constantly being watched.”66 A Syrian activist in Canada (who was not a part of our study) described the feeling as “a surge of excitement and dread, not knowing what will follow, when a new [malicious] email pings its arrival.”67 Victims have also expressed concerns regarding the safety and security of their immediate and extended community, such as family members, friends, or other dissidents.68 Other victims report that digital transnational repression pushed them to adopt different patterns of behaviour, such as keeping a low profile online, posting pictures of specific locations only after leaving them, and asking that conference biographies be kept offline.69 One article regarding a Burmese Karen refugee community in the UK described the profound impact that an intrusion incident had on its members, particularly in terms of community trust.70 The incident also involved an online smear campaign, which community members saw as “part of the psychological and physical warfare that extended from the ethnic cleansing of Karen communities in Burma, now extended to a newer, ‘virtual’ location.”71 Similarly, for the Rwandan diaspora, the Rwandan regime’s assassinations, physical harassment, and forcible renditions of nationals outside its borders have been combined with digital threats, such as the use of spyware and online harassment.72 The consequence of these and other tactics is a community-wide lack of trust on two levels: both between individuals and towards diaspora organizations.73 66 Privacy International (2014), “Surveillance Follows Ethiopian Political Refugee to the Uk,” Privacy International (16 February 2014) <https://privacyinternational.org/blog/1199/surveillance-followsethiopian-political-refugee-uk>. 67 Naheed Mustafa (2016), “Life in the Digital Life of the Syrian War,” Open Canada (18 October 2016) <https://www.opencanada.org/features/life-digital-shadow-syrian-war/>. 68 Ari Shapiro (2019), “Human Rights Activist Iyad El-Baghdadi Says U.S. Warned Of Saudi Arabia Threat,” NPR (15 May 2019) <https://www.npr.org/2019/05/15/723686069/human-rights-activist-iyadel-baghdadi-says-u-s-warned-of-saudi-arabia-threat?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter>; Dalmasso et al., “Intervention” at 4; Andrea Peterson (2015), “Spyware Vendor May Have Helped Ethiopia Target Journalists—Even after It Was Aware of Abuses, Researchers Say,” Washington Post (9 March 2015) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/03/09/spyware-vendormay-have-helped-ethiopia-spy-on-journalists-even-after-it-was-aware-of-abuses-researcherssay/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e0d9e60ce12b>; Leigh Day, “Legal Case”; Michaelsen, “Exit and Voice” at 256–257. 69 Michaelsen, “Exit and Voice” at 257–258 (see interviews on 26 August 2015 and 10 September 2015); Moss, “Ties That Bind” at 274. 70 Green and Lockley, “Karen Refugees.” 71 Ibid at 525. 72 Schenkkan and Linzer, Freedom House Report at 22. 73 Ibid at 26.