International human rights groups, which are often based in Western host societies, need to monitor and record cases of transnational repression in its various forms in a more systematic and active manner. Within the United Nations, transnational repression currently falls between the mandates of different bodies and therefore is not captured in its entirety. This should be corrected. Similarly, related initiatives focus on specific regions or cover only selected forms of transnational repression.123 Academic research and human rights advocacy therefore need to develop a comprehensive definition of transnational repression and guidelines for studying it in order to facilitate rigorous documentation. In general, host country governments need to be more aware of the extent and nature of harassment that dissidents residing on their territories experience. The status of asylum-seeker or political refugee fundamentally involves the need for assistance and protection in order to preclude further persecution.124 Practices of transnational repression, which violate the sovereignty of the host state as well as international human rights and refugee protection standards, should be a topic of diplomatic pressure on the perpetrating regimes. They cannot simply be ignored. Foreign policy makers need to consider these practices as actions undertaken by increasingly assertive authoritarian states to undermine principles of liberal democracy, and respond accordingly.125 New legislation may be required for appropriate action to be taken. In Europe and the United States, legal instruments penalizing human rights violations by external actors cover only blatant forms of transnational repression. Yet as this report has demonstrated, much of the repression that occurs today is that of a more subtle variety. On a positive note, the US government recently introduced the “TRAP Act” to restrict the ability of repressive governments to use Interpol to issue requests to detain and extradite political opponents abroad.126 In order to respond to the broader range of tactics of transnational repression it is important to familiarize and involve domestic agencies of law enforcement and so that they can more systematically use the instruments provided by the rule of law. For instance, Scandinavian countries impose legal penalties on foreign intelligence activities targeting dissidents in exile (so-called “refugee espionage”).127 Similarly, cybercrime laws could be used to litigate against targeted surveillance and hacking attacks on civil society activists.128 123 See, e.g., the Central Asian Political Exiles (CAPE) database of the University of Exeter Central Asian Studies Network, https:// excas.net/projects/political-exiles. A new project on transnational repression, launched in fall 2019 at Freedom House, seeks to measure the scope and scale of transnational repression globally, with an emphasis on collecting data on physical attacks against dissidents all over the world (website to be released). 124 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2014, February). Comments by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the Memorandum of 6 December 2013, proposing Criminalization of Refugee Espionage. https://www. refworld.org/docid/5829ad6c4.html. 125 Brechenmacher, S., & Carothers, T. (2019). Defending Civic Space: Is the International Community Stuck? Working Paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_Brechenmacker_Carothers_Civil_ Space_FINAL.pdf. Cooley, A. (2015). Authoritarianism Goes Global: Countering Democratic Norms. Journal of Democracy, 26 (3), 49-63. 126 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (2019, September 12). Helsinki Commission Leaders introduce Transnational Repression Accountability and Prevention (TRAP) Act. https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/press-and-media/press-releases/helsinki-commission-leaders-introduce. 127 Swedish Security Service. Refugee Espionage. https://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/en/swedish-security-service/counter-espio- nage/refugee-espionage.html. The German domestic security agency also warns refugees, especially those from Syria and Iran, of attempts to spy on and pressure dissidents in exile. Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. (2018). How can I identify extremists and members of foreign secret services within my environment? https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/publication-2018-02-important-information-for-refugees-in-germany.pdf. 128 McKune, S., & Deibert, R. (2017). Who’s watching Little Brother? Citizen Lab. https://citizenlab.ca/wp-content/ uploads/2017/03/citizenlab_whos-watching-little-brother.pdf. 37