Instead of appearing as a burden keeping activists from doing their “real” work, the informed and knowledgeable use of digital technologies needs to be presented as a way to maintain agency and autonomy under conditions of evolving sociotechnical risks. Recognizing the role of the individual in practicing digital security, however, does not mean one should neglect the broader power relations and structural inequalities forming around digital technologies. Protecting the right to privacy and freedom of expression in the digital realm demands a collective effort by all parties. This is particularly relevant for diaspora activists who maintain multiple ties and relations across countries and communities. Within these networks, a shared understanding of risks and vulnerabilities needs to be developed, and resources must be distributed more evenly. Establishing strong communities of practice will make it easier to provide more accurate information on threats as well as emergency support and advice on information security. Building coalitions to connect large, international organizations with smaller, local groups will allow support to be properly and rapidly scaled while also offering natural and trusted contact points for activists on the frontlines. In turn, Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) for civil society can be used to form an important backbone of such networks, linking rapid responders, digital security helpdesks, and infrastructure providers so they can all share data on incidents and resources for response.117 In addition, digital rights initiatives will help civil society take part in shaping the norms and regulations around privacy, data protection, and online expression in order to defend the new and vulnerable areas of civic space created by digital technologies. CONTAINING SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY Surveillance technology and related information controls used by repressive regimes must be contained. Research highlights the consequences of the proliferation of powerful surveillance tools across geographic and political borders. As demonstrated, threat actors from Iran, Syria, and Egypt often rely on conventional malware for attacks against civil society. Yet such attacks cause even more harm when employing advanced surveillance technology. Of the three countries, Egypt (and possibly the others) has already acquired commercial spyware on a large scale, including products of leading companies like Italy’s Hacking Team and the Israeli NSO group. The research findings make clear how authoritarian powerholders, when given the opportunity, abuse such invasive technologies to target dissidents and undermine fundamental rights within and beyond their territories. The report thus strongly supports the ongoing efforts being made to scrutinize and constrain the current opaque global market for commercial surveillance technology. The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, considers the threat of this industry so grave he has called for an immediate moratorium on the global sale, transfer, and use of surveillance technology until rigorous human rights safeguards have been put in place.118 Companies must observe the UN Guidelines for businesses and human rights, which require robust mechanisms of due-diligence, to prevent the abuse of their products for human rights violations. Unfortunately, the self-regulation of companies has proven insufficient. Strict rules and independent oversight are therefore needed to bring transparency and accountability into the market for spyware. Strengthening existing control regimes, for instance by making export licenses conditional upon a human rights review, is just one step of many that must be taken. Strategic litigation should also be used to constrain the deceptive practices of companies providing surveillance tools that interfere with the rights of targets. 117 See CiviCERT (https://www.civicert.org) as an example of such an international initiative, and TibCERT (https://tibcert.org) as an example of such a coalition of Tibetan organizations 118 United Nations Human Rights Council (2019). Surveillance and human rights. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promo- tion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ G19/148/76/PDF/G1914876.pdf. 35