In the same vein, another security expert working with Iranian diaspora organizations pointed out that individuals who have fallen prey to a digital attack often feel stigmatized and ashamed to admit it. Yet the reality is successful attacks happen quite often in the field. Activists need to accept this fact and share their experiences so that others can learn from them. The expert emphasized the importance of trust and vulnerability disclosure for the resilience of activist communities. At the same time, the respondent highlighted, increased awareness about digital threats among activists also meant that they needed more assistance to avoid people overconsulting with security advisers regarding harmless “false positives.”111 Groups and organizations with in-country staff emphasised that they needed better strategies for securing information and preventing access to accounts in case of arrests. Physical access to devices, for example after a seizure or arrest, allows security agents to gather detailed information about cross-border networks. To combat this recurring problem, interviewed digital security experts working in rapid response networks stressed the importance of privileged access to contacts in big social media companies so in cases of arrest social media profiles could be closed down or data secured. STRENGTHENING NETWORK RESILIENCE As highlighted by the interviews, activist security is closely intertwined with all members of a network and thus cannot appropriately be tackled on an individual level. An Iranian journalist described his perception of risks in transnational collaborations as follows: “The biggest risk in terms of digital security is that I respect all necessary measures but somebody else doesn’t. As if you were driving a car and you respect all the rules, but somebody else doesn’t and you get into an accident with that person.”112 Another Iranian journalist dealing with sources and contacts inside the country felt the responsibility to transfer her knowledge: “The updates I receive, I try to pass them on to my connections. Like Telegram is good for this and that conversation, but Signal is better for that. (…) Depending on the different people, time and circumstances, I am trying to advise them to be more safe. It is not only about me, they are more at risk.”113 For diaspora activists whose communities and peer groups are often distributed across several countries (including close ties to the repressive context of the home country), the protection of data and privacy is a collective effort. Activists cannot be considered as individuals with a certain risk profile that needs addressing. Instead, they must be viewed—and view themselves—as part of a larger network in which a successful attack against the weakest link can have severe consequences for all. Trainings and technical tools for digital security alone cannot provide sufficient protection against resourceful state actors targeting civil society across borders. Rather, the collective understanding of the threats faced by diaspora networks must be improved. Activists feel more empowered and resilient when they strengthen their ties to local and global networks for incident response, support, and information sharing. 111 Interview G1, December 2018. 112 Interview I12, February 2019. 113 Interview I8, December 2018. 32