According to a digital security expert, these types of attempts to disrupt online expression are more prevalent in times of political tension, protests, or elections. THREATS FROM EMBASSIES AND REGIME AGENTS Serving as outposts for security agencies, embassies and consulates provide different methods to monitor, control, and threaten diaspora activists. Consular services—such as passport renewal or the issuing of birth certificates—give regime authorities an opportunity to gather information and gain leverage over citizens abroad. A Syrian respondent reported that he underwent questioning by an employee of the embassy who eventually refused to renew his passport under an arbitrary pretext. Another activist recalled her hesitance to provide the Syrian embassy with her current address to receive documents by mail. A third Syrian interviewee decided to forgo the request for a renewed passport altogether, and instead filed an application for asylum in the host country. Because embassies also serve as voting stations for overseas citizens, national elections provide another opportunity for regimes to monitor political opposition in the diaspora. Egyptian respondents expressed fear that their voting behaviour in prior parliamentary and presidential elections had been documented in the embassy and transferred to security agencies in Egypt. One recalled that a fellow activist was arrested upon arrival at the Cairo airport and questioned about having invalidated his ballot in protest when voting in one of Egypt’s European embassies during the last parliamentary elections. Embassy staff also use their position in the host country to spy and disturb political activity in diaspora communities. They participate in public events dealing with the political situation in the home country to bring up government viewpoints or disrupt debates. For one Egyptian respondent, surveillance by regime agents abroad became the reason he chose to not return to the country after he was filmed and threatened by unknown men speaking in an Egyptian dialect at a conference in Italy. Another Egyptian human rights defender explained that consultations at the United Nations in Geneva were used by organizations affiliated with the government to approach and pressure exiled activists. Other Egyptian interviewees mentioned surveillance attempts in restaurants popular among emigrants, as well as possible infiltrations of activist circles by intelligence agents or informants reporting to the embassy. A Syrian respondent pointed out that regime supporters, possibly organized by the embassy, had tried to disturb demonstrations organized by activists in Berlin in order to publicly taint the image of Syrian migrants. THREATS AGAINST IN-COUNTRY RELATIVES While attempting to silence, sanction, or retaliate against dissidents living abroad, regime authorities often target relatives still living in the country.68 These threats can start with “friendly talks over tea” and escalate into interrogations, imprisonment, and even torture or assassination. In Syria’s context of high repression, just a short visit from regime agents will send a strong signal that authorities are taking note of what the activist is doing outside the country and that they are willing to use relatives as “hostages.” A Syrian journalist in an exiled media organization reported that his brother and a colleague were arrested “to get me back into the country.”69 Two years later, the families were informed that both had died in prison. Such extreme measures are not exclusive to Syria. An Iranian journalist and human rights defender suspected that, because of his activities, his brother in Tehran had been pressured and harassed for years by intelligence agents—eventually driving him to suicide.70 For regime authorities, threats against families provide a method to escalate extraterritorial repression. This type of “proxy punishment” is primarily used to constrain and retaliate against public activity, such as actions taken by journalists in influential news organizations or human rights advocates who have appeared in international media. 68 Moss, D., Michaelsen, M., & Kennedy, G. Going after the family: Diaspora activism, transnational repression, and proxy punishment. Manuscript to be submitted. 69 Interview S4, October 2018. 70 Interview I8, December 2018. 21

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