Targeted digital surveillance allows regime agents to reach targets irrespective of their geographic location. The success of an attack depends on the effort and resources invested in its execution and technical underpinnings, as well as the target’s security awareness. Interviewed experts agree that attacks on Iranian, Syrian, and Egyptian diaspora communities are not technically sophisticated but instead built on increasingly clever social engineering. This form of attack requires only a core group with technical expertise, allowing for easier scalability in the ranks of attackers packaging and sending out malware.60 Phishing campaigns rarely target only one specific individual. Instead, they build on the ties among activists in seeking to unravel entire groups and networks. Compromising the confidential information of one individual allows attackers to uncover new links and contacts which can then be used to swiftly expand their efforts while also potentially de-anonymizing in-country collaborators. The existence of this type of threat thus not only stresses individual activists seeking to protect their private information, but also increases pressure on whole communities. SLANDER, HARASSMENT, AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS Regimes and regime supporters use false and distorted information and verbal threats to pressure, silence, and taint the reputation of diaspora activists. Online harassment and disinformation against exiled dissidents can take various forms. In Egypt, broadcast media affiliated with the Sisi government have published direct threats against dissidents abroad. Prominent human rights defender Bahey el-Din Hassan and opposition leader Ayman Nour, for instance, were labelled as traitors on television shows calling for them to be kidnapped and killed.61 In another example, physical harassment of activists abroad was combined with slander in state-aligned media: after Egyptian participants in a workshop on human rights in Italy were followed and photographed by unknown men, pictures of the event resurfaced in TV programs in Egypt alleging that they were plotting against the country.62 An Egyptian civil society activist emphasized the psychological pressure these programs put on exiled dissidents: “Imagine you are living in Europe, in exile, and some fanatic Egyptian recognizes you from this media show. It puts your life in danger, you always have to be careful about your moves.”63 In Iran, dedicated websites and social media channels closely follow and dissect the content of external media programs to contradict their reporting and attack their staff. Some websites even copy the design of outside media, such as BBC Persian and Radio Farda, only to mock and falsify the content of the original. These duplicates have also published rumours about staff members and private details obtained from tapping the communication between outside journalists and in-country contacts or relatives. The editor of a popular Iranian news media underlined the principal aim of the publications: “This is of absolutely no interest to anyone. (…) The only target of this publication is me: to show me that I have to be careful, that they are watching me.”64 60 See also: Scott-Railton, J. (2016). Security for the high-risk user: Separate and unequal. IEEE Security & Privacy, 14(2), 79-87. 61 Euromed Rights (2018, April 18). Death Threats against CIHRS Director, Bahey el-Din Hassan. https://euromedrights.org/ publication/death-threats-against-cihrs-director-bahey-el-din-hassan/; Middle East Eye (2018, October 10), Exiled Opposition Leader Expresses Fear after Khashoggi Disappearance. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ exiled-egyptian-opposition-leader-expresses-fear-after-tv-death-threats-1398361292. 62 Euromed Rights (2017, May 23). Extreme Concern about the Harassment of Egyptian Human Rights Defenders in Italy. https:// euromedrights.org/publication/extreme-concern-harassment-egyptian-human-rights-defenders-italy. 63 Interview E9, January 2019. 64 Interview I15, March 2019. 19