REGIME CAPABILITIES AND DIGITAL THREATS Digital technologies have enhanced the capabilities of regimes seeking to engage in extraterritorial repression by enabling new tactics and and influencing established ones. Prior to the advent of the Internet, authoritarian regimes sought to control the activities of political exiles through propaganda campaigns, espionage, kidnappings, and assassinations.37 Now, in today’s world of intense cross-border communication and information exchange, these regimes have even more opportunities to monitor and respond to the activities of diaspora activists on a rapid and large scale. The governments of Egypt, Syria, and Iran have all created comprehensive systems of Internet censorship and surveillance with infrastructures propped up by the burgeoning global market for surveillance technology and information controls. Despite sales restrictions and export controls, all three regimes have obtained sophisticated technology to build architectures of mass surveillance capable of tapping into landline and mobile phone communications and intercepting Internet traffic. Egypt, in particular, has enjoyed relatively unrestricted access to the market for surveillance technology. In line with its multisided international relations, the Egyptian government has acquired equipment from German, Italian, French, and US-American manufacturers, and received technical support and training from China.38 In 2017, the United Arab Emirates transferred to Egypt a state-of-the-art surveillance system made by the French company Amesys.39 And in 2018, it was revealed that the Egyptian government had used the notorious spyware Pegasus produced by the Israeli NSO group.40 Despite both countries being placed under various sanction regimes, Iran and Syria have still found ways to circumnavigate export controls and purchase Western technology for mass monitoring of communications. In the years leading up to the 2011 uprising, Syria established a nationwide surveillance system with equipment of German, Italian, and US-American origin.41 In Iran, repression against the protests of the Green Movement in 2009 revealed the authorities’ use of monitoring technology produced by Nokia Siemens.42 With tightening sanctions and export controls, Iran has turned to China for surveillance technology and know-how.43 In terms of offensive information controls, the governments of Egypt, Syria, and Iran have all engaged in a range of digital attacks against civil society, both inside and outside their territories. The technical underpinnings and background of these campaigns have been documented in detail.44 37 Shain, Y. (1989). The Frontier of Loyalty Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State. London: Wesleyan University Press. 38 International Federation for Human Rights (2018, July 2). Egypt: A repression made in France. https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/ litigation/egypt-a-repression-made-in-france; Privacy International (2019). State of Privacy in Egypt. https://privacyinternational. org/state-privacy/1001/state-privacy-egypt; Weber, V. (2019). The Worldwide Web of Chinese and Russian Information Controls. Centre for Technology and Global Affairs, University of Oxford. p. 13. https://ctga.web.ox.ac.uk/files/ theworldwidewebofchineseandrussianinformationcontrolspdf. 39 Mada Masr (2017, July 5). UAE transfers internet surveillance system bought from French company to Egypt: Télérama. https://madamasr.com/en/2017/07/05/news/u/ uae-transfers-internet-surveillance-system-bought-from-french-company-to-egypt-telerama/ 40 Access Now (2019, May 20). Shutdowns, surveillance, and censorship: UPR reviews highlight threats to digital rights. https:// www.accessnow.org/shutdowns-surveillance-and-censorship-upr-reviews-highlight-threats-to-digital-rights. 41 Privacy International (2016). Open Season: Building Syria’s Surveillance State. https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/ files/2017-12/OpenSeason_0.pdf. 42 Center for Human Rights in Iran (2010, October 6). Shirin Ebadi: Nokia Siemens action a major accomplishment for Iranians and for the people of the world. https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2010/10/ shirin-ebadi-nokia-siemens-action-a-major-accomplishment-for-iranians-and-for-people-of-the-world/. 43 Stecklow, S. (2012, March 22). Chinese firm helps Iran spy on citizens. Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/ us-iran-telecoms-idUSBRE82L0B820120322. 44 Fire Eye (2015). Behind the Syrian Conflict’s Digital Frontlines. https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/ current-threats/pdfs/rpt-behind-the-syria-conflict.pdf; Scott-Railton, J., & Kleemola, K. (2015). London Calling: Two-factor authentication phishing from Iran. The Citizen Lab, Toronto. https://citizenlab.ca/2015/08/iran_two_factor_phishing; ScottRailton, J., Marczak, B., Raoof, R., & Maynier, E. (2017). Nile Phish: Large Scale Phishing Campaign Targeting Egyptian Civil Society. The Citizen Lab, Toronto. https://citizenlab.ca/2017/02/nilephish-report/. 14