OUT OF SIGHT, NOT OUT OF REACH The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression Facebook post explaining his decision to stop blogging.48 Harassment, threats, or physical actions against loved ones in the exile’s home country—collectively known as coercion by proxy—is understandably a potent tool.49 All but six of the states that engage in physical transnational repression are known to use this tactic. An upcoming paper based on over 200 original interviews with diaspora activists from across the Middle East found that the most common response to coercion by proxy was self-censorship.50 Contributing to its prevalence, coercion by proxy does not require extraordinary capacity on the part of the state as required by forms of transnational repression that reach across borders. Most of the states that engage in transnational repression already arbitrarily target real and perceived dissidents within their borders, harassing those who speak out, holding prisoners of conscience, and even disappearing opponents. Coercion by proxy does not require extraordinary capacity on the part of the state. Like coercion by proxy, minimal additional resources are needed to deploy online threats, harassment, disinformation, and smear campaigns. Having an active, critical voice is nearly impossible without an online presence. And, as digital surveillance scholar Marcus Michaelsen writes, “As much as social media help diaspora activists to circulate alternative information and opinion, these platforms can also turn into a toxic environment for abuse and threats.” Women face particularly noxious rhetoric, steeped in misogyny and often including threats of violence.51 14 @FreedomHouse Deploying malware may not yet be as simple as coercion by proxy and digital harassment, but commercially available options—including those developed by Italy-based Hacking Team, Israel-based NSO Group, an NSO affiliate called Q Cyber Technologies, and DarkMatter, an Emeriti company52— make it a possibility for more governments than ever before. As the research group Citizen Lab and others frequently expose through technical reports, dozens of countries have been found to engage in spyware campaigns domestically, and many of those countries deploy the same tools outside their national borders.53 A recent investigation by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and The Guardian found states hiring private companies to track cell phones internationally by accessing obscure phone operators in places like the Channel Islands.54 Freedom House found that at least 17 countries engaged in physical transnational repression also use spyware abroad. Governments may even be able to gain backdoor access to social media platforms—as when Saudi Arabia paid a Saudi engineer working for Twitter to provide information on dissidents’ accounts that would allow them to be physically located.55 China maintains a unique capability in this sphere because of the dependence of the Chinese diaspora on WeChat, a messaging, transactions, and social media platform over which the Chinese Communist Party exercises control.56 The covert nature of spyware and other forms of digital surveillance allow the origin states to bide their time, collecting intelligence and unravelling dissident networks, all while furnishing authorities with the insight needed to further escalate campaigns of transnational repression. #TransnationalRepression