CITIZEN LAB RESEARCH REPORT NO.151 33 y Examine the role of other business actors in facilitating digital transnational repression and assess how such businesses should respond. Entities to examine could include domain registrars, web-hosting companies, and companies whose services and products are used by other actors in developing and deploying digital surveillance technologies. Conclusion This report highlights how digital transnational repression impacts Canadian communities of dissidents and activists who are living in exile. In particular, such digital targeting has a serious impact on the well-being of victims, undermines their ability to engage in transnational advocacy work, violates fundamental rights such as the right to privacy, freedom of expression, and peaceful assembly, and increases the dangers faced by their family members and friends who remain within the country of origin. At the same time, the growth of the surveillance market and the continued spread of digital technologies around the globe mean that the phenomenon of digital transnational repression is likely going to grow in scale and impact. We have argued in this report that the Canadian government has to take action to help prevent these abuses and to protect targeted Canadian communities. As we outlined, a number of gaps exist in policy and law on these issues, which the Canadian government must begin to address. Areas for Further Research There are several areas of research to pursue to better understand digital transnational repression and to craft additional recommendations targeted at government, civil society, and business entities. These include: y Engaging with victims of digital transnational repression to understand how they define accountability in response to these threats, what remedies may be appropriate, and what their expectations are for how host states and companies implicated in digital transnational repression, such as social media companies, should respond. y Investigating how the practices of social media companies may enable digital transnational repression (for example, by taking down user pages or blocking accounts); examining how digital transnational repression may be different from other types of online harms; and identifying what gaps exist in how social media companies respond to digital transnational repression and what further recommendations should be made to these companies to address it.