28 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL WAR Hold the Perpetrators of Digital Transnational Repression to Account y Make official statements against digital transnational repression and ensure that the Canadian government’s policies and activities demonstrate that the protection of human rights both at home and abroad is a priority.98 The Canadian government needs to emphasize the importance of protecting the rights and freedoms of activist and dissident communities in Canada and understand that this problem is not confined to, for example, threats to business or Canada’s economic interests.99 For example, the United States Department of Commerce recently expressly noted the role of companies in facilitating transnational repression when it added a notorious spyware vendor, NSO Group, to the Department’s Entity List and restricted US exports to that company.100 This type of government activity sends an important message to the market that the sale of surveillance technologies to authoritarian regimes will not be tolerated. y Examine the possible use of targeted sanctions against foreign states, individuals, and entities that are responsible for, or complicit in, violations of international human rights law. This recommendation has also been made in the context of addressing transnational repression in the United States.101 y Review foreign state immunity law in Canada and implement the changes necessary to ensure that individuals subjected to digital transnational repression by foreign state actors are able to pursue a legal remedy in Canada. For example, in the United States context, foreign state immunity is a potential obstacle when a victim seeks to sue a foreign state actor for acts of digital transnational repression.102 y Examine how existing Canadian criminal law could be used to pursue the perpetrators and facilitators of digital transnational repression in Canada and educate the public and law enforcement on these provisions in the context of digital transnational repression.103 Further, consider whether a new crime specific to acts of transnational regarding how the US should address transnational repression, see Schenkkan and Linzer, Freedom House Report. 98 See Alliance Canada HK, “In Plain Sight” at 12. 99 See also Canadian Coalition on Human Rights in China, “Harassment & Intimidation” at 51. 100 United States Department of Commerce (2021), “Commerce Adds NSO Group and Other Foreign Companies to Entity List for Malicious Cyber Activities,” US Department of Commerce (3 November 2021) <https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2021/11/commerce-adds-nso-group-andother-foreign-companies-entity-list>. 101 Schenkkan and Linzer, Freedom House Report at 55. 102 Harvard Law Review (2018), “Doe v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,” Harvard Law Review 131 at 1179–1186 <https://harvardlawreview.org/2018/02/doe-v-federal-democratic-republic-of-ethiopia/>. 103 Digital transnational repression (and transnational repression) may fall within the scope of general