10 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL WAR Impacts of Digital Transnational Repression Self-Censorship and the Silencing of Transnational Networks Digital transnational repression serves as a constraint on the ability of emigrants to engage in home-country politics both in person and online and has a “dampening” effect on the voice of the pro-revolution diaspora living abroad through self-censorship.53 Digital technologies “increase the intensity, outreach, and immediacy of potential contacts and conflicts between the state actors and political exiles.”54 The mere possibility of being subject to digital surveillance by state or state-related actors and uncertainty around the scope and purpose of such surveillance activities pushes activists towards self-censorship.55 Even where established dissidents in exile may not stop using digital technologies, digital “threats deter the wider diaspora who wish to avoid being caught in the blacklisting dragnet from expressing their views.”56 Self-censorship can also lead victims to avoid speaking to law enforcement about threats to personal safety.57 Moreover, this silencing effect may serve to further cement the power of the ruling regime in the country of origin.58 Psychological Harm and Behaviour Modification Victims of digital transnational repression have explained that this threat has generated concerns about their privacy59 and feelings of insecurity,60 guilt,61 fear,62 uncertainty,63 mental and emotional distress,64 and burnout.65 An Ethiopian refugee in the UK, for House <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/12/application-international-law-state-cyberattacks/7conclusions-and-recommendations>. 53 Moss, “Case of the Arab Spring” at 486; Moss, “Ties That Bind” at 274–275. 54 Michaelsen, “Exit and Voice” at 261. 55 Michaelsen, “Toolkit”; Moss, “Defending Diaspora Activism.” 56 Dalmasso et al., “Intervention” at 4. 57 Moss, “Defending Diaspora Activism.” 58 Frantz. et al., “Autocracies” at 13. 59 Lake, “The Dark Side.” 60 Raphael Satter (2016), “Experts See Iranian Link in Attempt to Hack Syrian Dissident,” Associated Press (2 August 2016) <https://www.apnews.com/6ab1ab75e89e480a9d12befd3fea4115>. 61 Nina D Santos and Michael Kaplan (2018), “Jamal Khashoggi’s Private WhatsApp Messages May Offer New Clues to Killing,” CNN (4 December 2018) <https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/02/middleeast/jamalkhashoggi-whatsapp-messages-intl/index.html>. 62 Scott-Railton et al., “Group5”; Leigh Day, “Legal Case Launched Against Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for Alleged Use of Spyware to Target Dissident,” Leigh Day (28 May 2019) <https://www.leighday.co.uk/ News/2019/May-2019/%E2%80%8BLegal-case-launched-against-the-Kingdom-of-Saudi> [Leigh Day, “Legal Case”]; Al Jazeera, “China Spies.” 63 Danna Ingleton, “Amnesty International Affidavit in Support of Israeli Petition” Amnesty International (13 May 2019) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act10/0332/2019/en/>. 64 Ibid. 65 Michaelsen, “Toolkit.”