Conversion of Capital 199 [protest] really create change? It creates awareness, yes, to some degree. But ongoing protests, not really. You have to shift your energy towards something else. I was like, visibility is important. What else can we do instead? We tried to get more creative. [Tactics such as] flash mobs or messaging around the city, like wheat-pasting posters about Yemen. I could have taken it upon myself, but it also takes resources and bodies to do that. Mahmoud, a Sheffield-based organizer, described that relying on self-funded volunteers and private donations to keep their movement independent and credible made it difficult to keep protest events going. Honestly speaking, it was a high cost because the mobilization of people across cities exhausted us financially as well. With all of this, we do our normal jobs [at the same time]. The level of pressure that was on me was just crazy. Safa [in London], she was going mad because she is doing her full-time job and she put a lot of commitment into these activities. Though some organizers sustained protests into the fall, others – such as in the Liverpool community – reported that their local movements were “well and truly dead” by the summer. Morooj of Washington, DC, echoed this, explaining, [Protesting] was a weekly thing for a very long time. And then it just started trickling down. Not so many folks were coming down anymore, [feeling like it] doesn’t make a difference. I would say [that the movement died] maybe towards the end of September. And it was just kind of like, what should we do? Should we gather? That’s when it kind of died out. People were working, have families. They can’t just dedicate six hours a day. As a result of these resource shortages, organizers overwhelmingly reported feeling frustrated over their limited role and weak sense of efficacy. Adel of Dearborn cited that their Popular Support Committee to the Youth Revolution in Yemen was formed as “a reaction to what’s going on back home. So if there is something major, then somebody will do something about it. And if there is not, it would just stay quiet.” Amel of New York also lamented that their ad hoc mobilization efforts had “no long-term strategizing, there’s no long-term planning. You do last-minute protests. I feel that that works for the short term, but I don’t feel that’s effective in the long term.” Hanna echoed this sentiment, lamenting that for both the pro-secession and pro-revolution protests, “I’ve always felt our efforts were reactionary and we lose momentum after a rally or protest was over.” Without a sustainable organizational field, as in the Syrian case, Yemeni activists often felt left on the “backfoot,” as Omar in Liverpool attested. As explained in Chapter 4, Yemenis’ collective tactics focused on broadcasting and representing the revolution. To this end, many were able to convert their social capital to the mobilization effort. Safa, who had previously worked in public relations, issued press releases to the media about protest events in London. Awssan, with experience networking with Yemenis across Britain for https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009272148 Published online by Cambridge University Press