The Conversion of Cross-Border Networks 179 In Damascus now, it’s also very, very difficult to find activists because most of them got killed or detained or they had to flee the country, or they are now very afraid to become involved. Because now if someone is detained in Damascus, most probably they will never be released again and they will die in a detention center. So whether inside or outside Syria, it’s now more difficult to find volunteers. As activists’ cross-border contacts were depleted by violence, so too were their abilities to broadcast, broker, and remit aid. In this way, no-holds-barred repression by the Syrian regime has largely succeeded in severing the links forged between insiders and outsiders, and the transnational advocacy networks that made auxiliary activism possible. The fragmentation of the Syrian opposition on the ground, discussed at length in Chapter 3, also damaged activists’ network ties over time. Nidal Bitari, a Palestinian Syrian activist with the Syrian Expatriates Organization, stated that the problem with mobilizing to support the revolution was that “you don’t know for whom you are promoting now or advocating.” For this reason, Dr. Radwan Ziadeh and Marah Bukai, who had joined the Syrian National Council at its founding in August 2011,3 withdrew from this body in 2012. Explaining her decision, Marah said, 3 The Syrian National Council was formed in August 2011 to represent the revolution from Istanbul. This included those who had been a part of the 2005 Damascus Declaration (see Chapter 2), the Kurdish Future Movement, Muslim Brotherhood members (who held over a quarter of the seats), and members of the Local Coordination Committees. However, the council lacked authority and a grounded presence in Syria and was subject to internal disagreements (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami 2018). Several leaders resigned in March 2012 citing corruption, Muslim Brotherhood domination, and a failure to gain international support for the Free Syria Army (FSA). A Kurdish coalition known as the Kurdish National Council (KNC) also departed over differences regarding the Kurds’ regional sovereignty. In November 2012, a more sweeping National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces was formed in Doha as a result of international pressure; this body absorbed the original SNC and included more FSA representatives and liberals. Coalition offices, referred to as the Etilaf (https://en.etilaf.org/, accessed November 27, 2020), were granted as foreign missions under the leadership of Ahmad Jarba. Optimism was short-lived, however, as the coalition suffered from the same problems. Muaz Khatib, the coalition’s first president, resigned after only six months in response to a lack of support and meddling by outside states. By May 2013, major groups condemned the coalition and demanded more representation. As described by Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami (2018: 188), The Coalition, like the SNC before, produced the ugly spectacle of factions and personalities squabbling over the throne of a country which was going up in flames. . .. The ability to put aside personal and factional interests for the sake of a common goal, to adapt, to accommodate the other’s point of view, requires a background level of trust in the national community and its institutions, and long experience in democratic collaboration. Syria had been a cast-iron dictatorship for four decades, so these conditions did not apply. Beyond that, the Syrians had no Benghazi in which to base themselves, no field on which to enact transitional authority. Accordingly, “despite its hard work and diplomatic progress, all the Coalition won on the ground from its participation was the heightened disgust of activists” (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami 2018: 190). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009272148 Published online by Cambridge University Press