Transnational Repression 83 The reproduction of repression abroad meant that diaspora activists were unable to fully deploy their resources and exploit their political opportunities to wield voice after exit. Until the unthinkable (Kurzman 2004) occurred in 2011, the majority of anti-regime members in the diaspora remained silent in their views. Dissent networks remained isolated, and no member-driven organizations existed in the United States or Britain. 3.1.3 Weak Threats from the Yemeni Regime Abroad For the Yemenis, a relatively weak authoritarian regime at home meant that the anti-regime diaspora felt a comparatively weak sense of threat abroad, although concerns about transnational repression and the hazards of surveillance were not entirely absent. According to Halliday (2010[1992]: 142), Yemeni authorities engaged in the “monitoring of exiles’ political loyalties,” and several pro-secessionist southerners reported the fear of being exiled because of their activism. Many of those interviewed also attested that embassy officials effectively meddled in the affairs of the diaspora and attempted to undermine or co-opt organizing efforts. Ragih, a community leader in Sandwell, mentioned that the Yemeni government had paid people to demonstrate on behalf of Saleh in London, providing for their travel and giving them sandwiches and qat, a tobacco-like leaf that is chewed recreationally in Yemen (and was legal in Britain at the time). Additionally, another respondent in northern California accused their local consulate of undermining the work of the American Association of Yemeni Scientists and Professionals by meddling in its affairs. While I could not independently verify these accusations, it appeared to be a common belief that the Saleh regime officials acted as a saboteur in the community from behind the scenes. Unlike their Libyan and Syrian counterparts, however, none of the southern anti-regime Yemeni activists in Britain reported hiding their faces or their identities during protests or in petitions. This suggests that while Yemen’s weak authoritarian regime attempted to surveil and intimidate the diaspora, it lacked the necessary capacity to enforce compliance and deter mobilization. Others believed or knew that they had been surveilled but believed that this was more of a distraction than an actual threat. For example, Hanna Omar of the US-based South Yemeni American Association recalled, Constantly, constantly in our rallies, we would have one, three, four pro-Ali Abdullah Saleh [guys] coming in and seeing what we’re doing, coming to our meetings. It was just something we had to live with. The only thing I didn’t like about that is that it would take away the focus on what we were doing. Our own activists [would] concentrate on, well, this guy is pro-Saleh and what are we going to do about him? And then finally we were just like, it doesn’t matter. There’s nothing to hide. Everybody’s out here, everybody’s face is out in the open, everybody’s names are out in the open. It’s not like we’re going to hide this from the government there. So it doesn’t matter who’s pro, who’s not. Let’s just focus on our main goal and that’s it. That, of course, was easier said than done. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009272148 Published online by Cambridge University Press