12 MOSS ET AL . ‘will’ and the ‘way’ to mobilize publicly against highly repressive regimes. The absence of these mobilizing mechanisms rendered sending-state regimes successful in keeping their critics silent and fearful across state borders. Our study makes several theoretical interventions into the growing literature on globalized authoritarianism and transnational repression. First, the findings point to the negative effects of transnational social ties for anti-regime diaspora mobilization. Researchers typically consider network ties as a positive resource for diaspora activists, as they ‘are empowered by the contexts in which they maintain thicker linkages’ (Koinova, 2017, p. 602). In other words, the stronger their ties to home-country, the more likely they are to remain engaged in home-country affairs. We contend that the stronger their linkages to highly repressive states, the more likely activists will be exposed to authoritarian social control strategies. In fact, it is precisely the frequent use of internet communication technologies and social media—the contemporary equivalent of ‘cheap calls’ (Vertovec, 2004)—that create vulnerabilities for activists and their home-country relatives. With the help of digital technologies, regimes can more easily monitor the activities of diaspora dissidents, identify their contacts, and impose collective punishments on their parents, siblings, and cousins (see also Michaelsen, 2017, 2020; Moss, 2018). Because regimes instrumentalize these ties for political control, transnational networks transform into an impairment and an obstacle for transnational advocacy, despite diaspora members’ advantaged ‘positionalities’ in relatively liberal host-countries (Koinova, 2012). Accordingly, we suggest that scholars do more to consider the multivalent, conflicting effects of cross-border ties on diasporas, since transnational networks simultaneously promote and curtail political engagement in social movements. This paper also contributes to the literature on globalized authoritarianism by bringing attention to the role that cross-border collective punishment plays in the operation of regime repression and its deterrent effects. Studies of repression’s influence on dissent have acknowledged the importance of family ties in fostering protection and commitment to high-risk activism (Loveman, 1998), as well as showing how an actor’s responsibility for their nuclear family may deter participation in high-risk campaigns (McAdam, 1986). However, much of the extant literature on the ‘repression-dissent nexus’ (Earl, 2011) takes an individualistic approach, neglecting the use of state repression against activists’ non-activist networks (Deng & O’Brien, 2013; O’Brien & Deng, 2017; Opp, 1994). This blind spot likely stems from the predominance of Western perspectives in the social sciences, which consider individual-level punishment as normative basis for the state’s legal framework. Yet, this approach neglects the fact that anti-regime mobilization has meant putting one’s primary social group in danger throughout most of human history (Heckathorne, 1988; Moore, 1978). Our findings highlight the need to investigate repression as a collective, relational phenomenon that transcends the boundaries of the nation-state. This pervasive form of violence is likely to continuously increase in scope and severity so long as surveillance technologies make it ever-easier for illiberal authorities to track their opponents across the globe. Our study further contributes to theories of repression’s effects on protest by showing that the effects of proxy punishment on diaspora activists are not determined by the deployment of a particular tactic, or whether the threat against family members is ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ (e.g., Earl, 2011). Rather, diaspora members confront a repertoire of actions that are imposed on their family members at once and in a fashion that is hard for individuals to predict. Accordingly, we find that the application of a particular tactic does not determine an activist’s responses; rather, activists’ responses are shaped by their willingness and abilities to incur costs, both real and anticipated. Political commitment increases their willingness to fight despite the related risks and costs, and social capital provides the means for withstanding and offsetting those costs. As in cases where regime violence has been shown to create a ‘backlash’ effect, radicalizing protesters (e.g., Goodwin, 2001; White, 1989), we likewise find that diaspora activists who were harshly repressed at home are more likely to express a strong commitment to oppositional activities after emigration. The importance of social capital in this process also builds on studies demonstrating how a movement’s organizational capacity improves its members’ resilience against state repression (Barkan, 1985; Chenoweth et al., 2017). Our findings also extend Koinova’s (2012, 2017) argument that the greater diaspora members’ ties to the host-country context, the more resources and autonomy they will have at their disposal to pursue home-country political projects. This suggests the need to further investigate the