SUMMARY 1 Authoritarian regimes use a variety of repressive tools to control, silence, and punish dissidents living abroad. Although blatant acts of violence against political exiles, such as kidnappings and assassinations, occasionally catch the public’s attention, this report focuses on the more subtle and pervasive forms of transnational repression exerted against activists living outside their homeland. Using Egypt, Syria, and Iran as examples, the report examines how governments rely on surveillance, smear campaigns, and other threats to systematically disrupt cross-border information flows and curtail the opportunities of human rights defenders and journalists in exile. 2 The overseas export of this type of repression has a clear authoritarian intent. Through “toolkits” of transnational repression, regimes looking to shield themselves from criticism and accountability are able to foster restraint and self-censorship among activists living abroad. Targeted activists experience constant tension and stress, and see their ties to the home country undermined. In turn, the dynamics, impact, and outreach of diaspora activism are inevitably altered. These practices of transnational repression represent deliberate and systematic interferences in the fundamental human rights of the targets, primarily by violating their right to privacy and freedom of expression. 3 Digital technologies are essential components of all forms of this transnational repression. They reduce the costs of exerting political control while enabling regimes to monitor and respond to diaspora activism with greater scope and speed. Activists’ reliance on digital platforms and social media creates multiple points of exposure that regime agents can attack via malware, online harassment, and disinformation campaigns. These digital threats are often intertwined with more traditional methods of repression, such as pressure on families inside the country and slander in state media. 4 Although the use of digital security precautions is increasingly prevalent, diaspora activists often feel overwhelmed by the complexity of digital platforms and the rapidly evolving environment of sociotechnical risks. With ties across multiple countries and communities, these activists belong to networks in which a successful attack against the weakest link could lead to severe consequences for all involved. Uncertainty about the technical capabilities of regimes further exacerbates the chilling effects of surveillance. 5 To build the security and resilience of transnational civil society networks, it is therefore necessary to continue to raise the general level of understanding of digital technologies and the risks associated with their use. Protecting data and privacy is a collective effort that requires a more even distribution of risks and resources. Activists on the frontlines are empowered when closely tied to networks for incident response, long-term support, and information sharing. 4