They rely on powerful security agencies and systematic surveillance to detect and contain challenges to their power. They also invest significant effort in information controls to suppress criticism and promote narratives legitimizing their position, both at home and abroad. Authoritarian regimes draw—and carefully guard—“red lines” around topics and activities considered politically sensitive.33 Interviews with respondents revealed some of these lines which, if crossed, risked provoking a response from state agents. Topics included regime figures, security agencies, political prisoners, torture, corruption, economic problems, and ethnic and religious minorities. Several interviewees ended their list of taboo topics by essentially saying “everything is a red line” and, ultimately, “you better not talk at all.” Notably, these “red lines” can shift at any moment depending on the specific situation and context. This arbitrary exercise of power is an inherent feature of authoritarian rule, promoting fear and self-censorship among citizens—even across borders. One Egyptian human rights defender summarized the motives behind his government’s crackdown on civil society as follows: “Part of the obsession of this regime and of Sisi himself is establishing a narrative. They just want one narrative and nothing else. Anyone who promotes a different narrative is a threat to stability.”34 Despite the unpredictability of authoritarian repression, interviews revealed that these regimes aim to cut off two particular resources for diaspora activists: access to public attention, and linkages into their home country. Activists and journalists in the diaspora can act as “information brokers,” channelling knowledge and ideas across borders, raising awareness, and leveraging different audiences against the regime. With close ties to peers in the country, they can help to publicize and frame demands, scale up criticism, and provide support to people on the ground.35 Individuals and groups with influence over international or domestic publics are thus more likely to become a target of transnational repression—not only because they are more visible, but also because they are able to mobilize public opinion against the regime. At the same time, regimes target the links activists maintain to the home country in order to undermine relations between people inside and outside the country. Not only is transnational repression triggered by the specific activities of diaspora activists and their influence, it is also shaped over time by a regime’s international relations, domestic politics, and available resources. The Egyptian government, for instance, is particularly sensitive about human rights advocacy that risks harming its international image, especially vis-à-vis the United States and the European Union due to its reliance on military and economic aid. Less dependent on international support, the Iranian regime targets journalists working in influential news channels, such as the BBC Persian and Radio Farda (Radio Free Europe) due to their role in providing alternative information to audiences inside Iran. In addition, threats against the Iranian diaspora have intensified during election periods and surrounding the conflict over the country’s nuclear program.36 In the case of Syria, some respondents observed that regime attention to outside activism dropped during the critical phase of the civil war, but that threats against the diaspora increased again after the Assad regime regained control over strategic portions of the country. 33 Glasius, M. et al. (2017). Research, ethics and risk in the authoritarian field. Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3. Interview E16, June 2019. 34 Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca/New York: Cornell 35 University Press. The Iranian regime often heightens its controls of information and dissent around critical events, such as elections. Deibert, R., 36 Oliver, J., & Senft, A. (2019). Censors get smart: Evidence from Psiphon in Iran. Review of Policy Research, 36(3), 341-356. 13