OUT OF SIGHT, NOT OUT OF REACH The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression people; and to provide warnings about potential transnational crimes, among other functions. Interpol has limited capability to vet these notices before they are disseminated, however, and the vetting processes themselves are opaque. Where the notifying country’s judiciary and prosecution is subservient to political control, notices can and have been abused to pursue individuals on a political basis.39 At least 12 of the countries using physical transnational repression have successfully abused Interpol notices against their nationals since 2014, although the lack of transparency at Interpol makes it difficult to assess the scale of abuse. Even more countries have abused Interpol to reach non-nationals. Of 31 countries that use physical transnational repression at least 21 also employ mobility controls against exiles. Recent advancements in technology have enabled states to upload thousands or tens of thousands of requests without a concurrent growth in Interpol’s capacity to vet them before they are disseminated. The number of requests has skyrocketed: in 2019, Interpol issued 13,377 Red Notices, compared to just over 1,277 in 2002.40 Russia alone is responsible for a staggering 38 percent of all public Red Notices in the world.41 Unfortunately, the result has been widespread abuse of Interpol’s systems to detain and harass individuals abroad. Even in the United States, where the legal standard that Interpol notifications do not equal arrest warrants should be clear, there have been significant failings. For instance, Russian asylum seeker Gregory Duralev spent nearly 18 months in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention in 2018–19 based on an Interpol Red Notice from Russia.42 Moreover, some states have begun to bypass vetting entirely, by “diffusing” requests among member states without submitting them to Interpol’s central office.43 Notices and diffusions both have a tendency to linger in national systems, and as a result individuals subject to them can encounter difficulties crossing borders, opening bank accounts, or interacting with law enforcement agents.44 12 @FreedomHouse Due to high-profile cases of misuse and the long-term engagement of civil society, Interpol has improved some of its procedures and allocated more resources to vetting notices.45 In several public cases in recent years, Interpol has declined to disseminate notices that are politically motivated, or has voided notices that had were inappropriately placed on refugees. However, as authoritarian states become more savvy about the tools of transnational repression at their disposal, international cooperation becomes more complex and requires higher levels of investment to avoid manipulation. Controlling mobility Mobility controls are those in which the origin country leverages its power over government-issued documents— typically passports—to coerce or control its citizens. These controls cut to the international nature of transnational repression: they can simultaneously intimidate and pressure targets, restrict diaspora mobilization, and create opportunities to route transnational repression through other countries. Of the 31 countries that use physical transnational repression, at least 21 also employ mobility controls against exiles. Passport revocation is the simplest form of controlling mobility. With minimal resources and little to no reliance on external factors, a government can trap an individual in a known location. This tactic reduces opportunity for the target while creating new avenues of repression for the government. As transnational activism scholar Dana Moss writes, “Diaspora activists help those under siege to overcome their isolation, inform the global public about events that remain heavily repressed and censored, and provide an alternative to the regime’s monopoly over information.”46 The inability to travel creates practical limitations on diaspora activism by preventing exiles from traveling to events or other opportunities to mobilize and engage in advocacy. Locked in a specific location, an exile may also be more vulnerable to physical forms of transnational repression. A second mode of controlling mobility is reporting passports as lost or stolen in order to achieve the detention of individuals while they are in transit. Syrian journalist and activist Zaina Erhaim, who resided in Turkey at the time, was caught in this situation when she travelled to the United Kingdom in 2016. British authorities detained and questioned her for over an hour, and confiscated her passport, apparently acting on a notice from the Syrian government that the passport had been stolen.47 By presenting a flagged document at a border crossing, #TransnationalRepression